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Abstract 
Military operations abroad by the German Armed Forces are always a con-
troversial instrument of German crisis management. Yet, such foreign 
deployments are likely to remain necessary for the foreseeable future while, 
at the same time, they are undergoing noticeable change. The conditions 
shaping this transformation can be captured in three dimensions of change: 
the change in war and violent conflict; the transformation of the inter-
national political and legal context; and the shifting institutional frame-
works for these operations. 
German policy-makers must address the related challenges – whether 
setting normative anchors and formats for operations, contributing to sta-
bilisation in a context of continuing insecurity, building partners’ military 
capacities, dealing with transnational threats or using benchmarks for 
exiting. Yet, they only have limited influence over the described changes. 
Fundamentally, decisions about military operations abroad are taken within 
the triangle of pressing problems (crises and conflicts), responsibility (obli-
gations under international law, alliances, political commitments), and the 
political situation and available capabilities in Germany itself. 
It is hard to predict the developments which will dictate the scope for 
action within this triangle. However, the worst possible approach would 
be to address the described challenges only from a short-term and ad-hoc 
perspective, especially since they do not exclusively concern operations 
abroad. In its 2017 Guidelines on crisis prevention and conflict resolution 
and 2016 White Paper, the German federal government outlined a frame-
work for German engagement that it now has to fill. Furthermore, the 
expectations of Germany’s partners within the EU, NATO and UN have 
grown – which will also require further military contributions. 
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The Project “Operations Abroad by the  
German Armed Forces in Flux” 
Since early 2016, the SWP-based project has been looking into 
previous and current military deployments abroad by the Ger-
man Armed Forces. Its focus has been on their various modes 
of participation: missions under NATO command, multidimen-
sional UN missions, coalitions of the willing, and EU missions. 
The analyses included both the context of these operations and 
the civilian engagement; the main objective was to draw con-
clusions for future operations abroad. 
Throughout 2016, the project was accompanied by a group 
of external experts who have, in various capacities, been deal-
ing with military operations abroad and their contexts. Prior to 
this, expert-led talks had been held on the context, mandate 
and implementation of missions in the West Balkans/Kosovo, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, (Northern) Iraq and 
Afghanistan (for figures on operations to which Germany con-
tributed, see appendix, p. 45). The project team also organised 
a workshop in December 2016 on the experiences gained in 
evaluating individual military operations and civil-military 
cooperation, the perspectives on lessons learned in the UN and 
NATO, and specific methodological approaches for evaluations. 
We would like to express our gratitude to all the experts who 
participated in these meetings and discussions. Needless to say, 
the content of this study is the sole responsibility of its authors. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Missions in a Changing World: The 
Bundeswehr and Its Operations Abroad 
Since the early 1990s, Germany’s security policy has 
been influenced and changed in practice by the ex-
perience gained through operations abroad of the 
German Armed Forces (the Bundeswehr). They have 
paved the way for a reinterpretation of the Basic Law, 
whereby the federal government can deploy troops as 
part of a system of collective security – if approved 
by the German Bundestag. The concept of a “parlia-
mentary army” is closely tied to this specific form of 
operations. 
The debate about the alleged or actual “normali-
sation” of Germany’s foreign and security policy also 
has its origins in domestic discussions of the 1990s 
and 2000s about missions abroad. Political decision-
makers viewed these operations inter alia as an indi-
cation that Germany was assuming its responsibilities 
in international relations. From this point of view, 
they demonstrate the federal government’s willing-
ness to actively shape the international environment 
alongside others. 
Operations abroad of the Bundeswehr are also seen 
as an expression of political solidarity within NATO 
and the European Union (EU), and thus as a foreign 
policy instrument going beyond crisis management 
in the narrow sense. The frequent argument that Ger-
many cannot refuse to meet the expectations of its 
allies in this area illustrates this point. 
In addition, foreign deployments have accelerated 
the transformation of the Bundeswehr into a “force 
on operations”. The Federal Ministry of Defence has 
used these operations to justify numerous procure-
ment decisions during the past decades, and they 
have also played a decisive role in recruitment and 
development of personnel within the Bundeswehr. 
First and foremost, operations abroad by the 
Armed Forces have been and are a controversial in-
strument of German crisis management– whether 
they concern responding to ethno-nationalist violence 
(Bosnia, Kosovo), supporting a government in its stabi-
lisation and reconstruction efforts (Afghanistan), or 
fighting piracy (Horn of Africa/ATALANTA) and Islam-
ist terrorism (Iraq and Syria/Counter-Daesh). These 
examples demonstrate not only the breadth of opera-
tions abroad, but also the way in which they have de-
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veloped over time. Three dimensions of change stand 
out: the transformation of war, meaning changes in 
the type, scope and reach of armed conflict; the trans-
formation of the international political and legal con-
text, meaning the international community’s over-
arching understanding of political order as applied 
to peace operations; and the transformation of the in-
stitutional framework for these operations, meaning 
changes within the organisations that plan and carry 
out peace operations. These processes of transforma-
tion are not simultaneous, they influence each other, 
and they cannot be neatly separated. Taken together, 
however, they define the context within which today’s 
deployments abroad take place – a context which is 
unmistakeably different from the 1990s or even the 
early 2000s. Six key challenges for today’s operations 
abroad and peace operations more generally can be 
deduced. 
First, the normative foundations of peace opera-
tions and the political processes in which they need 
to be embedded are crumbling. A certain disillusion-
ment in Western capitals with the results of the 
larger state-building projects of the past decade co-
incides with increasing reservations in the UN Secu-
rity Council and in host nations about the liberal 
peace paradigm. A consensus must therefore be 
reached to ensure that missions and host countries 
proceed according to a common agenda. Without 
such a consensus, it is difficult to embed operations 
in a political process that also has the support of 
influential UN member states. 
Second, clarification is needed as to the coalitions 
and operational frameworks within which German 
deployments abroad should take place. The array of 
international actors directly engaged in conflict zones 
is becoming more multi-faceted, inter alia due to the 
growing number of missions by regional actors. At 
the same time, ad-hoc coalitions are more frequently 
deployed, for example in the fight against “Islamic 
State (IS)” in Syria and Iraq. The reliance on such coa-
litions raises questions of political control, the desired 
normative order and the operational framework. 
Issues such as these are likely to gain in importance 
in the coming years. 
Third, given the incomplete, fragile or absent peace 
agreements in many countries of deployment, there 
is a growing focus on stabilisation. Corresponding 
operations have an extensive “robust” mandate under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such a mandate – as in 
Mali or the Democratic Republic of Congo – requires 
specific capabilities and above all the will to actually 
implement it. At the same time, such mandates carry 
the risk that missions are seen as parties in the con-
flict. Where robust action is not part of the mandate, 
the question likewise arises of how to deal with per-
sistent insecurity and violence and how to achieve 
stabilisation by using civilian and locally legitimised 
means once an acute crisis has been defused. 
Fourth, there are challenges regarding the increas-
ingly important military capacity-building in partner 
countries through funding, advice, training and/or 
equipment of armed forces. This approach, summa-
rised in Germany as “Enable & Enhance”, is more and 
more often at the core of operations abroad, as in the 
EU training missions in Mali and Somalia. However, 
there are numerous other European and bilateral 
initiatives, which often operate in the same context 
without necessarily converging. Moreover, this ap-
proach alone is usually not sufficient to build and 
sustain security. So how should this instrument be 
integrated into the German and European toolbox; 
what objectives can be attained; and what critical side 
effects might occur? 
Fifth, operations in conflict zones are increasingly 
confronted with transnational and asymmetric threats. 
A consensus on whether and to what extent crisis 
management and peace operations should directly 
be involved in countering these threats – especially 
organised crime and terrorism –has yet to be achieved. 
Further challenges lie not only in providing an ad-
equate analysis of the complex networks involved, 
but also in the capacities required for taking action 
against threats related to these networks – which 
reach far beyond the area of deployment. 
Sixth, there is the “exit management” for opera-
tions abroad. The endpoint of a deployment can be 
defined temporally or be tied to attaining concrete 
objectives. Long-term operations such as in Kosovo or 
Afghanistan have shown the importance of defining 
benchmarks more clearly and systematically 
(re)checking them over time. 
German foreign policy must address all of these 
challenges whilst being able to exert only limited 
influence on the dimensions of change outlined. 
Fundamentally, decisions about operations abroad 
will have to take into account the need for action 
emerging from crises, international responsibility 
(obligations under international law, alliances, politi-
cal commitments), and the political situation and 
available capabilites in Germany itself. 
It may be hard to predict the developments which 
will define the room for manoeuvre within this 
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triangle. However, it would be politically unwise to 
address the described challenges only on an ad-hoc 
basis, particularly as they do not exclusively concern 
military operations abroad. In its 2017 Guidelines on 
“Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, Building 
Peace”, and in its 2016 White Paper, the German fed-
eral government outlined a framework for German 
engagement in conflict situations. That framework 
now has to be filled. Furthermore, Germany’s part-
ners within the EU, NATO and UN still expect more 
from it – including in the form of military contri-
butions. These strands have to be brought together 
when the Bundestag decides on German contribu-
tions to peace operations, extending ongoing con-
tributions, adapting them to changing circumstances, 
or terminating them. 
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Despite numerous trouble spots, the phase of large-
scale stabilisation operations such as in Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Afghanistan seems to be coming to an 
end, at least where NATO and the EU are concerned. 
The pivotal factor is not general pacification making 
such operations superfluous, but mainly political 
fatigue in the capitals of troop-contributing countries, 
where sobering questions are being asked about 
the political goals that can be sustainably achieved 
through such operations. 
While some UN peace operations have been com-
pleted or downsized in recent years, the remaining 
large missions are struggling to manage conflict in 
highly insecure environments without a clear pros-
pect of a viable political solution. These peace opera-
tions in Mali, DR Congo, Central African Republic, 
Sudan and South Sudan comprise four in five of all 
military personnel and police currently deployed 
under UN command.2 Within NATO, a turn away 
from military stabilisation operations can be dis-
cerned from 2012 onwards (if not earlier), when the 
Alliance decided at its Chicago Summit to end the 
ISAF mission in Afghanistan by 2014. NATO’s deci-
sions at its summits in Wales (2014) and Warsaw 
(2016), which were its response to Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea as well as the destabilisation of eastern 
Ukraine, marked the final breakthrough of a develop-
ment that amounts to a (re)prioritisation of collective 
defence. The Bundeswehr’s deployment numbers also 
illustrate this phenomenon: from 1991 to August 
 
1 The term “operations abroad” is commonly used by the 
German Armed Forces for the original German term “Aus-
landseinsätze”. Other translations like “missions abroad”, 
“expeditionary missions” or “foreign deployments” can also 
be found in official documents of the German government. 
This study applies “operations abroad” as the key term while 
sometimes also applying the other terms where appropriate. 
2 Center on International Cooperation, Peace Operations 
Review 2018 (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 
2018), 8. 
2017, a total of 408,932 German soldiers were in-
volved3 in 52 mandated operations abroad.4 At the 
highest point over 10,000 German soldiers were 
simultaneously deployed abroad. In late May 2018, it 
was less than half that number: Germany contributed 
just over 4,000 soldiers to a total of eleven missions 
– three NATO, three EU and four UN missions, and 
one so-called coalition of the willing. Additionally, 
there was a nationally led operation (STRATAIR-
MEDEVAC) and the participation in two further inter-
national missions (UNSMIL in Libya and MINURSO in 
Western Sahara).5 In only one of these operations – 
Resolute Support in Afghanistan – does Germany 
currently act as a “lead nation”. 
Since the early 1990s, German policy has primarily 
planned for political and military crisis management 
within multilateral formats, which were considered 
the most likely deployment scenario given the secu-
rity environment. By contrast, issues of collective de-
 
3 Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), Antwort auf schriftliche 
Fragen 8/28 und 8/30 der Abgeordneten Sabine Zimmermann vom 
4. August 2017 (Berlin, 11 August 2017), https://www. 
linksfraktion.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_Dokumente/ 
Anfrage_Bundeswehr.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
4 We use the expression “operations abroad” to encompass 
all Bundeswehr operations outside of Germany that are 
mandated as such by the Bundestag, that generally occur 
within a multilateral framework and that are legitimised by 
a resolution of the UN Security Council wherever they in-
clude the use of military violence to carry out their mandate. 
For multilateral crisis operations in the broader sense, we 
use the term “peace operations” in line with United Nations 
practice. 
5 See bundeswehr.de, Einsatzzahlen – die Stärke der deutschen 
Kontingente (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 25 May 
2018), http://bit.ly/Bw_Einsatzzahlen (accessed 29 May 2018); 
the authors’ itemisation does not take into account two 
operation-equivalent commitments: the contribution to 
Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 in the Aegean and Ger-
many’s role as lead nation for the combat troop battalion in 
Lithuania as part of enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). 
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fence were seen as politically outdated or simply as 
basic functions of the Bundeswehr and NATO alike, 
in light of the fundamentally cooperative attitude of 
states within the Euro-Atlantic area. Numerous deci-
sions on alliance policy, the military and armaments 
policy over the past 25 years reflect this view. 
The annexation of Crimea in 2014, which indicated 
that the normative core of the Euro-Atlantic security 
order since 1990 had eroded, triggered a paradigm 
change in German policy and within NATO. The 2016 
German White Paper still treats crisis management as 
virtually equal to collective defence. However, accord-
ing to the provisional conceptual guidelines on the 
Bundeswehr’s future capability profile, published in 
spring 2017, by 2032 the armed forces’ capabilities 
will be primarily re-aligned with collective defence and 
deterrence – and thus with NATO’s defence plan-
ning. This also involves a turn away from the 2011 
guidelines for a reorientation of the Bundeswehr. 
It would be premature to plan 
exclusively for collective defence. 
From today’s perspective, it may have been hasty 
to align the Bundeswehr’s range of tasks – and thus 
also its structures, equipment and supplies – almost 
exclusively along multilateral crisis management. 
However, it would now be just as premature to plan 
exclusively for collective defence. The EU and NATO 
strategic frameworks point to at least a certain con-
tinuity. NATO’s Strategic Concept from 2010, which 
defines international crisis management as one of 
three tasks along with collective defence and coopera-
tive security, continues to be valid. The EU’s 2016 
Global Strategy also continues to list crisis manage-
ment in Europe’s neighbourhood as one of its security 
tasks. The current geopolitical situation will require 
continuous or rather increasing European contribu-
tions. Moreover, the security situation in the countries 
of deployment of large, ongoing UN missions has de-
teriorated rather than stabilised, making a continuing 
engagement for an extended period very likely. 
Finally, the changing level of ambition in Germa-
ny’s foreign and security policy does not support the 
conclusion that the era of military operations abroad 
has come to an end. Likewise, the voices of Germany’s 
partners in the EU and NATO, which have since 1990 
called ever more clearly for Germany to assume more 
military responsibility, have become rather louder – 
especially since the 2014 Munich Security Confer-
ence, at which Germany very prominently articulated 
its readiness to take on more international responsi-
bility. One facet of this is of course a continued active 
involvement in international crisis management in-
cluding through Bundeswehr operations abroad.6 
There is a need to address military operations 
abroad not despite an increasing insistence on the 
comprehensive approach, but because of it. In the 
Guidelines that the federal government adopted in 
June 2017, “Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, 
Building Peace”, it outlined the structures and pro-
cesses of this approach in more detail. Foreign deploy-
ments of the German Armed Forces, it stated, remained 
an instrument that could “help to restore and con-
solidate security and stability and to strengthen legiti-
mate security structures”7; in isolation, however, they 
were ineffective. 
The main assumption of this study is not that 
deploying the Bundeswehr should be the primary 
means of German crisis management. But the closer 
ties between diplomatic, development and security 
instruments in crisis regions presupposes that chal-
lenges for operations abroad are precisely identified. 
Germany has long promoted the primacy of civilian 
approaches, including in the Guidelines. However, 
even if increased civilian efforts to solve conflicts and 
promote peace are strengthened, operations abroad 
will not entirely be a thing of the past, especially if 
German soldiers are to be deployed in larger numbers 
as part of UN peace operations (as is the case in Mali). 
To identify the challenges accompanying such con-
tributions to multidimensional frameworks, one 
needs to understand the transformations that shape 
both operations abroad themselves and their inter-
national context. A brief overview of German security 
policy debates and decisions of the past two decades 
regarding operations abroad, however, will first pro-
vide the domestic context. 
 
6 See statements by the Federal Minister of Defence, quoted 
in Johannes Leithäuser, “Leyen verteidigt Einsatzdauer”, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 December 2017. 
7 Federal Government of Germany, Guidelines on Preventing 
Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace (June 2017), 84, https:// 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/1214246/057f794cd3593763 
ea556897972574fd/preventing-crises-data.pdf (accessed 
28 August 2018). 
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White Papers tend to be documents of strategic 
reflection and affirmation in security policy. They 
reveal, in condensed form, security-policy challenges, 
shifts in priorities, and new instruments. The 2006 
White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr makes clear that deployments abroad were 
already part of the “normal” modus operandi of the 
German Armed Forces at the time. Among the tasks 
of the Bundeswehr, the document lists international 
conflict prevention and crisis management including 
the fight against terrorism in first place, followed by 
supporting allies, protecting Germany and its citizens, 
rescue and evacuation, and subsidiary forms of assis-
tance.8 
The previous White Paper, from 1994, still mainly 
focused on adapting security policy to the power-bloc 
confrontation having ended and to German reunifi-
cation. For the first time, its authors placed crisis 
management operations on an equal footing with 
national and allied defence.9 In operational terms, 
Germany quickly became involved in such operations 
after reunification: as early as 1992–1993, Berlin 
supported the UN transitional authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) with 150 emergency medical staff. Germany 
contributed to the air bridge linking Somalia to Kenya 
as part of UN mission UNOSOM II from 1992 to 1994 
and provided logistical support for UN troops. As part 
of the German contribution, 1,700 soldiers were sta-
tioned in Belet Uen, and a further 600 marines and 
120 air force soldiers in Djibouti and Mombasa. In 
 
8 Federal Ministry of Defence (ed.), White Paper 2006 on 
German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin, 
2006), 55. 
9 Federal Ministry of Defence (ed.), White Paper 1994 on the 
Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and 
Future of the Bundeswehr (Bonn, 1994), para 254. 
1992–1993, the German Armed Forces also helped to 
monitor the weapons embargo in the Adriatic Sea and 
the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The SPD and FDP parliamentary groups subsequent-
ly lodged a complaint with the Federal Constitutional 
Court against the AWACS surveillance flights enforc-
ing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SPD 
also sued over the participation of the German Navy 
in the embargo against the remainder of Yugoslavia, 
and over operations in Somalia. The Federal Constitu-
tional Court in Karlsruhe considered the four lawsuits 
together,10 and in its decision of 12 July 1994 con-
firmed that “out-of-area” deployments conformed to 
the German Basic Law under three conditions: they 
required, first, a mandate from the UN Security Coun-
cil; second, a multilateral action framework for the 
deployment; and third, a mandate from the German 
Federal Parliament. Its ruling thus forms the legal 
basis for parliamentary approval but also for the 
“force on operations”. 
Almost concurrently, three events plunged peace 
operations into a crisis: the battle for Mogadishu in 
1993 and the withdrawal of the UN from Somalia two 
years later; the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; and the 
case of the UN “safe area” in Srebrenica in 1995. In 
the short term, these events led to a marked reduc-
tion of peace operations worldwide. In the long term, 
they influenced the conception of peace operations, 
 
10 On this point, see Decision of the Second Senate, Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court, 12 July 1994 – 2BvE3/ 
92 –, and Georg Nolte, “Bundeswehreinsätze in kollektiven 
Sicherheitssystemen. Zum Urteil des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts vom 12. Juli 1994”, Zeitschrift für auländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 54 (1994): 652–755 (654), 
http://www.zaoerv.de/54_1994/54_1994_3_4_a_652_755.pdf 
(accessed 23 March 2018). 
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the normative debate, and the perception of such 
operations, including in Germany. 
Cornerstones of the Debate 
In 2006, after more than two decades of intense con-
troversies, the era of profound debates on operations 
abroad seemed to be provisionally over. A tacit 
consensus had formed in Germany whereby military 
crisis management by the Armed Forces, while not 
the preferred instrument of security policy, was none-
theless both possible and acceptable. Thus, the 2006 
White Paper’s remarks on deployment abroad occa-
sioned no major controversies. 
The deployment to Afghanistan 
ignited all the issues that still 
determine the debate. 
Simultaneously, the political and academic debate 
turned to specific operations. The German Armed 
Forces’ deployment to Afghanistan from 2001 on-
wards has certainly attracted the most attention in 
the academic literature and public discussion. This 
particular deployment ultimately ignited all the 
issues that still determine the debate: the comple-
mentarity of military, political and economic instru-
ments in stabilising states; the demarcation of state-
building from counter-insurgency and counter-terror-
ism; generalisable criteria for deciding whether or not 
to participate in operations abroad; and the criteria 
for success, how to measure them, and how then to 
bring such operations to a close. 
Networked Security 
The expression “Vernetzte Sicherheit” (Networked 
Security) was introduced into the debate by the 2006 
White Paper and gained particular conceptual im-
portance in subsequent years. The Paper stated that 
“It is […] not possible to guarantee security by going it 
alone, or with armed forces only. What is called for, 
rather, is an all-embracing approach that can only be 
developed in networked security structures based on 
a comprehensive national and global security ration-
ale.”11 The ensuing debate first focused on clarifying 
the terminology: “networked security”, “networked 
 
11 Federal Ministry of Defence (ed.), White Paper 2006 
(see note 8), 22. 
approach”, “whole-of-government approach” or “com-
prehensive approach”. Some observers expressed con-
cern that the phrase “networked security” concealed 
an increasing militarisation of conflict manage-
ment.12 By contrast, “comprehensive approach” (“Ver-
netzter Ansatz”) appeared more capable of creating 
consensus. Ultimately, the goal behind all this ter-
minology was “to effectively prevent or address inter-
national violent conflicts by coordinating the resources 
of all relevant institutions and using them through 
pooling and/or division of labour”.13 While the idea 
has gained acceptance in principle, its implementa-
tion still generates controversy. 
Criteria for Operations Abroad 
Since the early 2000s, with almost a decade of experi-
ence of operations abroad, another strong focus of the 
debate both in politics and in academia has been to 
develop sets of criteria for Germany’s participation 
or non-participation in such operations. In autumn 
2006, the then-deputy head of the CDU/CSU parlia-
mentary group argued that decisions about deploying 
the German Armed Forces had to be taken on the 
basis of German interests, fundamental German po-
litical values, and obligations to alliance partners, and 
he named a series of relevant criteria.14 In January 
2007, the regional parliamentary group of the CSU set 
out ten guidelines for military operations abroad by 
the German Armed Forces to improve the predictabil-
 
12 For a discussion about terminology, see also the debate 
in the Federal Parliament Subcommittee Crisis Prevention, 
26 March 2012. On this point, see Andreas Wittkowsky, Ver-
netzte Sicherheit: Begriff, Einordnung und Umsetzung in der Konflikt-
bearbeitung. ZIF-Thesenpapier zur Anhörung des Unterausschusses 
“Zivile Krisenprävention und vernetzte Sicherheit” (Berlin: Zentrum 
für Internationale Friedenseinsätze [ZIF], 26 March 2012), 
http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/ 
dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_ Thesenpapier_UA_ 
ZKvS-2012.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
13 Andreas Wittkowsky and Jens Phillipp Meierjohann, 
Das Konzept der Vernetzten Sicherheit. Dimensionen, Herausforde-
rungen, Grenzen, ZIF Policy Briefing (Berlin: ZIF, April 2011), 
2. English translations from cited texts are by the study’s 
authors, unless otherwise indicated. 
14 See CDU/CSU group in the Federal Parliament, “Kriterien 
für Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr”, press report, 11 Sep-
tember 2006, https://www.cducsu.de/presse/texte-und-
interviews/kriterien-fuer-auslandseinsaetze-der-bundeswehr 
(accessed 23 March 2018). 
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ity and reliability of decision-making.15 Shortly after-
wards, Winfried Nachtwei, who at the time was the 
Bündnis 90/Green Party’s spokesperson on security 
and disarmament, also drafted criteria, which he 
summarised with the question, “Is an operation for 
the purpose of collective security urgent, reasonable, 
legal, achievable and responsible, or none of the 
above?”16 In the political sciences and within think 
tanks, there was also deliberation on appropriate 
criteria.17 
Despite the number of differences between the sets 
of criteria highlighted above (as well as others), four 
common categories emerged, whose relevance for the 
decision-making process continues to be generally 
agreed: 
1. the legality and legitimacy of the operation; 
2. risks and the prospect of success; 
3. the significance of the operation for German 
security and/or German interests; 
4. formal or informal obligations to alliances and 
partners. 
None of the authors claimed that decision-making 
could be based on generalised criteria, emphasising 
instead that they were merely for guidance. Ultimate-
ly, they said, decisions had to be made case by case, 
taking into account specific conditions. 
“Focus on Operations” 
2010 and 2011 were dynamic years for the Bundes-
wehr and its operations abroad – not so much in 
terms of new deployments but rather in terms of 
national political and defence-policy processes. In 
2010 NATO published its Strategic Concept, and the 
Bundeswehr structural commission published its 
 
15 CSU Land group in the Federal Parliament, Leitlinien für 
Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr. Beschluss der XXXI. Klausur-
tagung der CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag vom 
8. bis 10. Januar 2007 in Wildbad Kreuth. 
16 See Winfried Nachtwei, Auslandseinsätze: Lehren und Kri-
terien, 12 February 2007, http://nachtwei.de/index.php? 
module=articles&func=display&catid=99&aid=471 (accessed 
23 March 2018). 
17 See Volker Perthes, “Wie, wann, wo, wie oft?”, Internatio-
nale Politik 62, no. 5 (Mai 2007): 16–21; Auslandseinsätze der 
Bundeswehr. Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren, ed. 
Stefan Mair, SWP-Studie 27/2007 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, September 2007); Winrich Kühne, “Kri-
terien, Interessen und Probleme der deutschen Beteiligung 
an internationalen Friedenseinsätzen – Wann? Wohin? 
Warum?”, Friedenswarte 1 (2007): 23–38. 
report entitled “Focus on Operations”, whose recom-
mendations became the basis for the subsequent 
reform of the German Armed Forces. The recommen-
dations primarily aimed to orientate structures and 
processes in the Bundeswehr and defence ministry 
more towards the requirements of operations abroad, 
and to streamline structures and staffing needs ac-
cordingly. Based on the political objective that future 
actions continue to be multinational – meaning 
within NATO, the UN or the EU – the commission 
emphasised that Germany would not be providing 
the full capacity by itself in every conceivable case.18 
Participating in international military 
crisis management now seemed to 
have become the permanent state of 
affairs in security policy. 
Nevertheless, the report developed ambitious 
objectives – not without referring to obligations 
towards German partners. For instance, it recom-
mended doubling the number of soldiers sustainably 
available for operations from 7,000 to 15,000, per-
haps as an expression of solidarity and capability 
within the alliance.19 This report thus establishes the 
deployment paradigm, namely the assumption that 
the Bundeswehr’s entire political, military and finan-
cial planning should grant operations abroad the 
highest priority. Participating in international mili-
tary crisis management now seemed to have become 
the permanent state of affairs in security policy, with 
a broad consensus as a matter of principle within 
both the executive and the legislative (except for the 
categorical rejection of military operations abroad 
by The Left parliamentary group).20 
Defence-Policy Guidelines 
Crisis management is also prioritised in the Defence-
Policy Guidelines (VPR) of May 2011, which form the 
political basis for the conception of the Bundeswehr. 
The document justifies giving the Armed Forces this 
 
18 Federal Ministry of Defence, Report of the Bundeswehr Struc-
tural Commission. Focus on Operations. Concentration, Flexibility, 
Efficiency (Berlin, October 2010), 26. 
19 Ibid., 10. 
20 On this point, see e.g. the briefing paper by their parlia-
mentary group demanding the immediate withdrawal of the 
German Armed Forces from all deployments abroad: https:// 
www.linksfraktion.de/themen/a-z/detailansicht/bundeswehr-
auslandseinsaetze/ (accessed 23 March 2018). 
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orientation primarily by a series of threat scenarios 
that could individually or jointly lead to the Bundes-
wehr being deployed abroad. It highlights in particu-
lar possible threats emanating from state failure: 
“Failing and failed states cause threats such as civil 
war, regional destabilisation, humanitarian crises 
and related phenomena including radicalisation and 
migration movements that help create safe havens 
and retreats for international terrorism and organised 
crime.”21 
The guidelines describe a broad task profile for the 
Bundeswehr, consisting of national defence (or collec-
tive defence within NATO); international conflict pre-
vention and crisis management; contributing to mili-
tary tasks as part of the CSDP; homeland security; 
rescue and evacuation; and hostage rescue abroad. 
They also contain unambiguous statements on the 
prioritised capability profile of the Bundeswehr: “The 
more likely tasks of international conflict prevention 
and crisis management determine the outline of the 
new Bundeswehr structure. Essentially, the forces 
available for these tasks also fulfil the requirements 
of territorial and collective defence as well as home-
land security tasks of the Bundeswehr. Where core 
tasks of the Bundeswehr demand it, these forces must 
be supplemented by additional structural ele-
ments.”22 The order of magnitude envisaged by the 
2011 VPR for international crisis management is 
substantial, even though it remains lower than the 
structural commission’s previously mentioned 
suggestion from 2010: around 10,000 soldiers were to 
be kept ready and available for this task.23 
Germany on the UN Security Council 
The German debate about military operations abroad 
was shaped not only by country- and region-specific 
considerations, but by the respective multilateral 
framework for action and the associated political 
commitments for such operations. This became ob-
vious when Germany took up a non-permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council in 2011/2012. Right at the 
beginning of this period, in March 2011, Germany’s 
 
21 Federal Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines. 
Safeguarding National Interests – Assuming International Respon-
sibility – Shaping Security Together (Berlin, May 2011), 2, http:// 
www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/16136/0c1b6d8d0c0e6ba0aed5 
f0feb0af81d8/g-03-110527-vpr-engl-data.pdf (accessed 16 
August 2018). 
22 Ibid., 14. 
23 Ibid., 11. 
abstention during the vote on Security Council Reso-
lution 1973 caused controversy. The resolution 
authorised UN members to establish a no-fly zone 
over Libya and take all necessary measures to protect 
the population. It thus provided the legal basis for 
NATO operation Unified Protector, whose additional 
objective was to impose an international weapons 
embargo. Germany’s abstention on the vote – jus-
tified by the then-federal government with reference 
to Germany’s “culture of military restraint” – was 
contentious primarily because the Resolution was the 
first by the Security Council authorising a mission 
that so explicitly referred to the so-called responsibility 
to protect and was thus deemed to buttress that 
emerging norm. 
Problematically, the federal government contra-
dicted its claim to a “culture of restraint” with its con-
temporaneous military engagement in Afghanistan. 
Ultimately, France, the UK and the US as supporters 
of the Resolution also voiced criticism of Germany’s 
voting behaviour because they saw it as renouncing 
solidarity with NATO. Berlin also simultaneously sup-
ported its alliance partners politically in the North 
Atlantic Council, giving the impression that its posi-
tion was inconsistent. This led to doubts over Ger-
many’s reliability and solidarity with the alliance. 
“Enable and Enhance” 
While the Bundeswehr’s military operations abroad, 
such as in Afghanistan, aimed to secure and assist the 
fundamental redesign of the post-conflict state order, 
a new aspect of operations emerged as of 2011. It con-
cerned enabling individual governments or regional 
organisations in the interests of subsidiarity to man-
age security challenges themselves and thus safe-
guard peace and international security under the UN 
Charter. Such measures are partly embedded in peace 
operations. 
In EU missions, for instance, the shift of emphasis 
from “security provider” to “security advisor” has 
been unmistakable, even though the formats have 
not replaced each other, and training, equipping and 
advising security forces in third states is not in that 
sense a new instrument. This approach became the 
subject of German debate primarily via the “Enable 
and Enhance Initiative”, which the federal govern-
ment has been pursuing in various forums since 
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2011.24 The debate took a new turn when the federal 
parliament authorised the Bundeswehr in September 
2014 to support the Kurdish Peshmerga in Northern 
Iraq in their battle against the so-called “Islamic 
State” by providing training. Even though the arming 
of the Peshmerga was not yet part of the Enable and 
Enhance Initiative – which was launched bilaterally 
later – two fundamental conceptual questions have 
since shaped the argument: one, to what extent can 
parties in a conflict or violent non-state actors legiti-
mately be enabled; and two, what is the relationship 
between enhancing and enabling and direct stabili-
sation through military crisis management?25 
New Responsibility 
The overarching debate about Germany’s increased 
global responsibility and its new view of its role as 
a global actor is also, and especially, crucial where 
military operations abroad are concerned. A signifi-
cant impetus for the discussion was the 2014 Munich 
Security Conference, although there had certainly 
been precursors.26 An increased German contribution 
to international crisis management did not necessarily 
mean a greater number of extensive stabilisation 
operations, but rather making available critical or 
special capabilities alongside – or possibly under the 
command of – Germany’s partners, such as France, 
the EU or the UN. Germany’s commitment in two 
operations in Mali since 2013 illustrates this ap-
proach: the EU training mission (EUTM) and the UN 
stabilisation mission (MINUSMA). It is worth noting 
that Germany contributes large numbers of personnel 
to MINUSMA as well as high-end capabilities: a spe-
cially equipped reconnaissance company, the recon-
naissance drone TP Heron, and helicopters. 
 
24 On the background, see Jana Puglierin, Die “Ertüchti-
gungsinitiative” der Bundesregierung: Was steckt dahinter?, Arbeits-
papier Sicherheitspolitik, no. 1/2016 (Berlin: Bundesakade-
mie für Sicherheitspolitik, 2016). 
25 On this point, see also Claudia Major, Christian Mölling 
and Judith Vorrath, Train + Equip = Peace? Stabilization Requires 
More Than Capacity Building, SWP Comment 4/2015 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2015). 
26 See Neue Macht – Neue Verantwortung. Elemente einer 
deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik für eine Welt im Umbruch, 
ed. German Marshall Fund and Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik (Berlin, 2013). 
Parliamentary Approval 
The national framework for operations abroad also 
repeatedly came under discussion. In particular, the 
work of the commission to verify and secure parlia-
mentary rights when mandating Bundeswehr opera-
tions abroad triggered a debate on the Parliamentary 
Participation Act or the requirement for parliamen-
tary approval. The commission was launched by the 
Federal Parliament in March 2014 and tasked with 
verifying whether the Parliamentary Participation Act 
needed to be adapted, in particular with a view to the 
deepening integration within NATO. The commission 
submitted its final report in August 2015, which 
largely confirmed the legal status quo. The modifica-
tions and exceptions that it suggests primarily con-
cern the deployment of soldiers to NATO and EU 
headquarters, and forces that are armed exclusively 
for self-defence or unarmed forces, such as during 
observation and training missions or logistical and 
medical assistance missions.27 Additionally, it called 
for annual and ad-hoc parliamentary debates on se-
curity policy particularly in view of international 
security cooperation – which is deepening percep-
tibly – as well as corresponding advances in military 
integration. It also called for fundamentally improved 
evaluation of operations abroad. During the legis-
lative period 2013 to 2017, there was no reform of the 
Parliamentary Participation Act, despite the fact that 
a corresponding draft law had already had its first 
reading in the German Bundestag.28 
The 2016 White Paper 
The White Paper presented by the Federal Govern-
ment in July 2016 entitled White Paper on Security Policy 
and the Future of the Bundeswehr has developed into 
a cornerstone of the debate on military operations 
abroad. As with the Defence Policy Guidelines, it lists 
collective defence within NATO and the EU, inter-
national crisis management and homeland security 
(or national crisis and risk prevention) as tasks of 
 
27 See German Federal Parliament, 18th legislative period, 
Unterrichtung durch die Kommission zur Überprüfung und Sicherung 
der Parlamentsrechte bei der Mandatierung von Auslandseinsätzen der 
Bundeswehr, Document 18/5000, 16 June 2015, 33 and 35ff. 
28 Ibid., 46ff., where there is a synopsis of the text of the 
Parliamentary Participation Law containing the modifica-
tions suggested by the commission. 
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almost equal significance for the Bundeswehr.29 How-
ever, overall, particularly when compared to the pre-
vious White Paper, the focus on collective defence 
within NATO and the EU, is somewhat stronger.30 
Simultaneously, the White Paper continues the 
discourse of the 2014 Munich Security Conference 
and stresses Germany’s new responsibility on the 
world stage. In contrast to the EU Global Strategy 
adopted the same year, which clearly prioritises 
Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhood, the 
White Paper does not set any regional focus.31 How-
ever, it includes extensive provisions on the action 
framework for crisis management. The UN is men-
tioned in the first place, followed by the EU, NATO, 
OSCE, bilateral partnerships and ad-hoc coalitions. 
The discourse in this section appears to signal greater 
openness towards UN-led operations, but also a new 
pragmatism concerning ad-hoc coalitions.32 
Continuities and Asynchronicities 
The 2006 and 2016 White Papers are linked by a 
series of continuities: the acknowledgement that 
international crisis management continues to 
be necessary, including by military means where 
required; the effort to couple military operations 
abroad with realistic conceptions of political order; 
and an acceptance of Germany being expected to 
assume more responsibility in international politics. 
However, the debate on security policy also en-
compasses opposing trends. Besides a fundamentally 
critical view of using the military to assert concep-
tions of political order, the operations in Afghanistan 
have had a generally sobering effect with regard to 
large stabilisation operations.33 There is also increas-
 
29 See Federal Ministry of Defence (ed.), White Paper 2016 on 
Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin, 2016), 
91ff. 
30 Ibid., 88. 
31 European External Action Service (EEAS), Shared Vision, 
Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the Euro-
pean Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, https:// 
europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/file/814/download?token=I-
Kb0OrS (accessed 23 March 2018). 
32 See also Markus Kaim and Hilmar Linnenkamp, The New 
White Paper 2016 – Promoting Greater Understanding of Security 
Policy? SWP Comment 47/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, November 2016). 
33 On the first aspect, see Klaus Naumann, Einsatz ohne Ziel? 
Die Politikbedürftigkeit des Militärischen (Hamburg, 2008). On the 
ing doubt over the prospects of success of multi-
dimensional (and, above all, more robust) UN peace 
operations in increasingly complex conflict contexts. 
At the same time, the need for comprehensive and 
long-term approaches is seen as a central lesson 
learned from the experiences of the past decade. 
The necessity for international crisis management 
and the expectations placed on it seem to be growing 
still further; the shift in national and international 
parameters for military operations abroad is complex 
and does not unfold straightforwardly. As a conse-
quence, the Bundeswehr has to adapt its capabilities 
to ever new challenges. 
The Capabilities of the 
German Armed Forces 
The security-policy debate about German military 
operations abroad has always concerned two issues: 
the objectives and framework of German military 
operations abroad, and the required military capa-
bilities. 
To date, the German federal govern-
ment has been able to meet all its 
military commitments within NATO, 
the EU and the UN. 
Germany has so far been able to meet all its mili-
tary commitments within NATO, the EU and the UN. 
Whether or not Germany can offer more military in-
volvement in the future and respond to the call of 
UN Secretary-General Guterres for more German blue 
helmets largely depends on the availability of Bundes-
wehr forces that are fit and ready for action.34 In turn, 
this depends not only on the physical availability of 
soldiers, but also on their level of training, equip-
ment and matériel, which has to be appropriate for 
each theatre of operation and the specifics of each 
mandate. 
 
second, see idem, Der blinde Spiegel. Deutschland im afghanischen 
Transformationskrieg (Hamburg, 2013). 
34 See “UN-Generalsekretär: ‘Wünsche mir mehr deutsche 
Blauhelm-Soldaten’”, Der Stern, 14 February 2018, https:// 
www.stern.de/politik/ausland/un-generalsekretaer-antonio-
guterres-appelliert---wuensche-mir-mehr-deutsche-blauhelm-
soldaten--7862278.html (accessed 23 March 2018). 
 The Capabilities of the German Armed Forces 
 SWP Berlin 
 Missions in a Changing World: 
 The Bundeswehr and Its Operations Abroad 
 September 2018 
 17 
Personnel: After 25 years of continuous downsizing, 
the Federal Ministry of Defence decided in May 2016 
to raise the overall strength of the military personnel 
to 198,000 soldiers (“personnel trend reversal”). This 
was considered necessary to meet growing security 
challenges and increasing international obligations. 
In March 2018 the total staff of the Bundeswehr 
still stood at 179,496 active soldiers. This should not 
be equated with the number of personnel reporting 
for duty every day in its units and formations, which 
is around 140,000 to 150,000. When calculating avail-
ability for operations, the significant number of staff 
on education courses and in training or on leave at 
the time must be taken into account, just as the fact 
that the above-mentioned total includes not only 
soldiers in operational units, but also those serving in 
the Federal Ministry of Defence, command authorities 
and offices, schools, training centres, national and 
integrated headquarters, etc. 
The number of soldiers available for additional 
operations abroad is also reduced by measures 
beyond mandated operations abroad and operation-
equivalent commitments. Consider, for instance, the 
greatly increased frequency of training exercises as 
part of NATO’s reassurance measures, which commit 
additional soldiers nationally or internationally,35 
and then consider that the permanent secondment of 
forces for continuous tasks such as air policing, host 
nation support for allied armed forces and national 
risk prevention (forces for hostage rescue and the 
evacuation of German nationals and other wards 
from crisis regions). 
Furthermore, since late May 2018, just over 4,000 
soldiers have been on 11 mandated deployments 
abroad and two international missions, and a further 
total of about 700 on two operation-equivalent com-
mitments: Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 in the 
Aegean and the combat troop battalion in Lithuania 
as part of enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). If we take 
into account preparing for and debriefing after the 
operations, the number of participants (4,700) in 
operations triples, showing that 14,100 soldiers are 
permanently committed to mandated operations 
abroad or operation-equivalent commitments of the 
Bundeswehr. A significant number of offices and sol-
diers in Germany are occupied with command, com-
munications and logistical-support tasks for these 
 
35 According to Federal Ministry of Defence planning, in 
2018 up to 12,000 soldiers are meant to be made available 
for such drills alone. 
operations. A conservative total estimate of those 
committed (in the broadest sense) to operations ab-
road would therefore be more than 16,000 soldiers. 
If the current scale of mandated operations abroad 
is maintained, this number will once again increase 
substantially – probably to a total of just under 
28,000 – due to Germany’s contribution to the NATO 
Response Force, including its role as lead nation in 
providing NATO-VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force) in 2018–2019 and 2020, and to the EU Battle 
Groups in 2018 and 2020. 
This shows that the number of soldiers theoretically 
available for any future operations abroad lies con-
siderably below the total size of the armed forces 
mentioned above. This has already led to a sizeable 
“vacancy management”, and not only in the contin-
gents of ongoing mandated operations abroad.36 To 
summarise: operational tasks are becoming ever more 
varied, and the total number of operational commit-
ments is growing – including through the refocusing 
of collective defence and a series of commitments 
of various scopes relating to the NATO reassurance 
measures of the NATO summits in Wales (2014) and 
Warsaw (2016). Since measures to reverse the down-
ward staffing trend still need to be implemented and 
have an impact, the number of personnel available 
for undertaking further operations abroad can be con-
sidered rather low. 
Matériel: An additional factor in evaluating readiness 
for duty and the possibility of taking on new commit-
ments is the armed forces’ matériel. In the early 
1990s, the Bundeswehr still deployed on mandated 
operations abroad with the equipment and matériel 
that had previously been available for collective de-
fence in Central Europe – and which had, accordingly, 
been developed for the geographical, topographical 
and climatic conditions of Central Europe. In other 
words, as long as operations abroad took place in 
Germany’s own “backyard” (for instance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo), there were initially no 
noteworthy problems with the equipment or maté-
riel, apart from the fact that some of it was already 
 
36 According to the annual report of the parliamentary 
ombudsman for the armed forces (59th report, 20 February 
2018, p. 21), “21,000 military posts below the grade of 
sergeant were vacant” in the reporting year 2017, https:// 
www.bundestag.de/blob/543920/e2535fce8d264119b54523 
ead6537ffb/jahresbericht-2017-pdf-data.pdf (accessed 20 Feb-
ruary 2018). 
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over 30 years old, which generated increasing main-
tenance costs. 
This shifted with the increased deployment radius 
and the changes in environmental conditions and 
threat scenarios (for instance through improvised ex-
plosive devices, etc.). Adaptations and new purchases 
became necessary; in particular, the dynamically 
evolving operations in Afghanistan accelerated this 
process. Many of the procurements occurred outside 
of the regular budgetary procedures and through 
the “Rapid Procurement Initiative” mechanism. 
The Ministry prioritised operations that were part 
of international crisis management and seen as deter-
mining structures, but neglected the remaining struc-
tures as capabilities for collective defence assumed 
a lower priority. This created “hollow structures”, 
which had to manage without being fully equipped. 
Because of the need to make additional savings since 
2011, the Federal Ministry of Defence has also inter-
vened in ammunition and spare parts stockpiling and 
the allocation of funds for materiel maintenance. This 
has taken its toll, leading, inter alia, to a conspicuous 
lack of spare parts. 
In the fourth quarters of 2014, 2015 and 2016, the 
German Bundestag defence committee received the 
respective annual report on the material deployability 
of the main weapons systems of the Bundeswehr – 
documents that essentially describe the shortages 
plainly and clearly.37 Press reports on the deploy-
ability of the Bundeswehr – including submarines, 
frigates, helicopters and battle tanks – had already 
hinted that no improvement could be expected for 
2017. The report on the material deployability of the 
main weapons’ systems of the Bundeswehr dated 
26 February 2018 has confirmed this concern.38 
The leeway for new and larger 
operations abroad by the Bundeswehr 
is currently very limited. 
The parliamentary ombudsman for the armed 
forces has addressed the issue prominently in recent 
 
37 See e.g. Thomas Wiegold, “Bericht zur Materiallage 
der Bundeswehr: Warten auf den Verteidigungsausschuss”, 
Augen Geradeaus!, 24 November 2017, http://augengeradeaus. 
net (accessed 13 May 2018). 
38 Federal Ministry of Defence, Bericht zur matériellen Ein-
satzbereitschaft der Hauptwaffensysteme der Bundeswehr 2017, 
https://www.dbwv.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Mediabilder/ 
DBwV_Info_Portal/Politik_Verband/2018/Bericht_ 
Einsatzbereitschaft.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
annual reports.39 He emphasised in early 2018 that 
although operations abroad with small contingents 
were easily managed, the Bundeswehr as a whole 
could not currently be deployed for collective de-
fence.40 If we accept this verdict – as the context 
clearly suggests we should – then the leeway for new 
and larger operations abroad by the Bundeswehr or 
the provision of high-value assets for additional UN 
missions is currently very limited. This will only 
change if the currently looming development of the 
defence budget actually allows for the announced 
trend reversals in personnel, matériel and finances 
to be successfully implemented. Even if it does, sub-
stantial improvement will take at least years. 
 
39 See e.g. the annual reports 2014 (56th report), German 
Bundestag, 18th legislative period, Document 18/3750, 27 
January 2015; 2015 (57th report), German Bundestag, 18th 
legislative period, Document 18/187250, 26 January 2016; 
2016 (58th report), German Bundestag, 18th legislative period, 
Document 18/10900, 24 January 2017, and 2017 (59th report), 
20 February 2018. 
40 “Scharfe Kritik an Einsatzbereitschaft der Bundeswehr”, 
Cellesche Zeitung, 21 January 2018. 
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It is practically impossible to make reliable state-
ments about future operations abroad by the Bundes-
wehr. Changes in parameters, however, are available 
for analysis. These modify the pressure to act on the 
German government and parliament, as well as their 
room for manoeuvre, and thus influence not only 
whether operations abroad take place or are con-
tinued, but also how. 
1st Dimension: The State of War and 
Security-Policy Challenges 
The increased debate over deployments of the Bun-
deswehr outside of the NATO zone (out of area) and 
Germany’s first military experiences in international 
crisis management came at a time of change in wars. 
After the end of the East-West conflict, the number of 
armed conflicts first increased markedly (peaking at 
51 active conflicts in 1991) before dropping in the 
2000s, reaching its lowest point of 31 in 2010.41 How-
ever, the more fundamental transformations had 
already begun after World War Two, in particular the 
growing dominance of wars within states rather than 
between states, and shifts in the regional distribution 
of armed conflicts. 
Conflict Types and Regions 
According to the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachen-
forschung (Working Group Research on the Origins of 
War, AKUF), 249 of the 176 wars conducted between 
1945 and 2014 were within states.42 Even if types of 
 
41 Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Con-
flicts, 1946–2014”, Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 4 (2015): 
536–50. 
42 Wolfgang Schreiber, Innerstaatliche Kriege seit 1945, Dos-
sier Innerstaatliche Konflikte (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, 10 November 2015), http://www.bpb.de/ 
conflict are differentiated beyond intrastate and inter-
state, as they are in the Heidelberg Conflict Baro-
meter, intrastate conflicts are in the clear majority 
in 2016 as well.43 The regional distribution of armed 
conflicts also changed, even before 1989, “from the 
centres of the world order to its periphery”.44 This 
mainly concerns the relocation of war from Europe to 
other regions of the world. More than 90 percent of 
the wars that occurred between 1945 and 2010 were 
in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.45 
Wars are less frequently settled by 
military decisions and more 
frequently by mediation – the 
apparent price being an increased 
rate of recurrence. 
These findings are relevant for several reasons. 
On average, intrastate wars last longer than interstate 
ones. According to AKUF statistics, no interstate war 
since 1945 has lasted for more than ten years, where-
as more than 20 percent of intrastate wars have. Less 
than 30 percent are resolved within one year. It 
should also be noted that, overall, wars are less fre-
quently settled by military victory and more frequently 
by mediation – the apparent price being an increased 
 
internationales/weltweit/innerstaatliche-konflikte/54508/ 
innerstaatliche-kriege-seit-1945 (accessed 23 March 2018). 
43 The Barometer distinguishes between “interstate, intra-
state, substate, and transstate conflicts”. Numbers for con-
flict intensity for 2016 from the Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2016, 
vol. 25/2017, 15. 
44 Lothar Brock, “Vorwort”, in Sabine Kurtenbach and 
Peter Lock, Kriege als (Über)Lebenswelten: Schattenglobalisierung, 
Kriegsökonomien und Inseln der Zivilität, EINE Welt-Texte, vol. 16 
(Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2004), 11–19 (13). 
45 Roy Karadag and Klaus Schlichte, “Die Verunsicherung 
der Welt. Aktuelle Gewaltkonflikte und globale Ordnung”, 
Politische Vierteljahresschrift 57, no. 4 (2016): 534–59 (536). 
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rate of recurrence. In the early 2000s, about 60 per-
cent of ostensibly solved conflicts reignited within 
five years.46 
Because of the changes outlined above, the catego-
ry of intrastate conflicts has been further differen-
tiated. Academia now uses concepts such as “violent 
conflict” or “armed violence” to capture the variety of 
types and manifestations of conflicts. The expression 
“organized violence”, for instance, is employed within 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) to en-
compass not only the established category of civil 
war, but also armed conflicts carried out exclusively 
between non-state actors or one-sided violence of an 
organised actor against unarmed civilians.47 These 
differentiations were not only driven by the increase 
in intrastate conflicts, but by their growing complexity 
and blurred boundaries. 
“New Wars” and Transnational Threats 
In the early 2000s, the debate about “new wars” con-
centrated on the characteristics of and driving forces 
behind armed conflicts.48 A contentious issue was the 
extent to which fundamental change had occurred 
after the end of the East-West conflict in the actors, 
objectives, methods, and forms of financing of (civil) 
wars. According to the thesis of “new wars”, the 
boundaries are increasingly dissolving between state 
and non-state actors, who are connected in many 
ways and use ethnic or religious identities, rather 
than political ideologies, to mobilise. Moreover, open 
warfare is fairly rare, and violence mainly targets 
civilians. The “new wars” are also no longer chiefly 
funded by state money but by “private” sources: loot-
ing, “taxes” on humanitarian aid, diaspora donations, 
kidnappings, or the smuggling of oil, diamonds, drugs 
and other goods.49 Critics primarily argued that many 
of the listed characteristics were not actually new, but 
 
46 Sebastian von Einsiedel (with Louise Bosetti et al.), Civil 
War Trends and the Changing Nature of Armed Conflict, Occasion-
al Paper 10 (Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for 
Policy Research, March 2017), 2. 
47 Erik Melander, Organized Violence in the World 2015: 
An Assessment by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Paper 
9/2016 (Uppsala, 2016), 2. 
48 See e.g. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence 
in a Global Era (Stanford, 1999); Herfried Münkler, Die neuen 
Kriege (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2004). 
49 Mary Kaldor, “In Defence of New Wars”, Stability. Inter-
national Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 1 (2013):  
1–16. 
had already occurred in the World Wars, for exam-
ple.50 The research literature also used the expression 
“new war” to describe more and more phenomena 
and thereby devalued its content.51 
Regardless of how armed conflicts are categorised, 
the debate on the privatisation of violence and the 
economy of intrastate wars directed greater attention 
onto the logic behind the actions of violent actors. 
The relevant research usually ascribes one of two 
motives to (non-state) parties in conflicts: either indi-
vidual economic profit-seeking (greed) or responding 
to political exclusion or inequalities, such as e.g. by 
ethnic discrimination (grievance).52 From the former 
perspective, war economies – such as developed in 
the 1990s in Liberia, Sierra Leone or Angola – exist 
not only to finance the armed combat. The associated 
economic incentives are also considered a cause for 
the outbreak of these wars. Others point to the signifi-
cance of group identities in connection with political 
and economic inequalities for mobilising violence.53 
Whether the economic interests of those who use 
violence are the cause for a conflict or whether they 
become an end in themselves during the fighting, 
they are overwhelmingly seen as prolonging the con-
flict. Furthermore, war economies do not just have an 
impact within the state, but can also destabilise the 
surrounding region by their transnational linkages 
in smuggling, organised crime and similar factors.54 
The connection between changing wars and the 
weakness or failure of states is another aspect. Since 
the 1990s, the State Failure Task Force, for example, 
has recorded intrastate conflicts and violence as an 
expression of state failure.55 The terror attacks of 11 
 
50 Klaus Schlichte, “Die politische Ökonomie des Krieges”, 
Initial – Berliner Debatte, 20 March 2008, https://www.linksnet. 
de/artikel/21088 (accessed 23 March 2018). 
51 Christopher Daase, “Neue Kriege und neue Krieg-
führung als Herausforderung für die Friedenspolitik”, in 
Der ambivalente Frieden, ed. Ines-Jacqueline Werkner and 
Ulrike Kronfeld-Goharani (Wiesbaden, 2011), 21–35 (21). 
52 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance 
in Civil War, Oxford Economic Papers 56 (Oxford, 2004), 
563–95. 
53 Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Hal-
vard Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War (Cambridge, 
2013). 
54 Schlichte, “Die politische Ökonomie des Krieges” 
(see note 50). 
55 Later renamed the Political Instability Task Force. See 
Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, 
PITF – State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of 
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September 2001 put the spotlight on the risks for 
international security associated with state failure. 
Research has identified fragile states as places of 
retreat or transit for transnational terror networks. 
Transnational illegal activities, especially those linked 
to organised crime, were also increasingly considered 
security threats. It is no coincidence that the 2003 EU 
Security Strategy lists as key threats (alongside the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) terror-
ism, regional conflicts, the failure of states, and 
organised crime, which interlock in many ways. The 
complexity of armed conflict in the past decade par-
ticularly originates in this interaction. 
As the 2016 OECD report on fragile states shows, 
connections can be drawn between the dimensions of 
fragility and violence. Thus, in contexts of high politi-
cal fragility all forms of violence occur at high levels 
and with greater intensity; and where economic fra-
gility increases, so do homicide rates and social vio-
lence. The places with high security fragility are among 
the most violent in the world: this currently concerns 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and South Sudan in par-
ticular.56 
Alongside massive violence, another challenge that 
should not be underestimated is the relatively high 
probability that newly pacified countries will find 
themselves in a situation of renewed civil war within 
a decade.57 Even where long-lasting armed conflicts 
have been settled, the consolidation of peace will 
require a great deal of patience. 
The complexity of armed conflicts and the signifi-
cance of transnational influences that became appar-
ent in the past decade can be seen as the expression 
of new threats or simply as continued challenges. 
Either way, the use of irregular or non-conventional 
methods has changed warfare. This is especially true 
for the US-led “global war on terror” and the counter-
insurgency in Afghanistan. While these may not 
necessarily be new forms of war, major changes in 
information, organisation, doctrine and technology 
have certainly occurred that will have a lasting im-
pact on military operations abroad.58 Both here and 
 
Governance, 1955–2014 (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic 
Peace, 6 May 2015), http://www.systemicpeace.org/ inscr/ 
PITFProbSetCodebook2015.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
56 States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence (Paris: OECD, 
2016). 
57 Anke Hoeffler, Growth, Aid and Policies in Countries Recover-
ing from War (Paris, 2012), 4. 
58 However, according to Ehrhart, these are characteristics 
of “postmodern warfare”, which should be considered a new 
in conflict dynamics generally, the distinction be-
tween war and peace has often become blurred.59 
Formal declarations of war have become at least as 
rare as comprehensively negotiated peace accords. 
A Tendency of More Violence and 
Increased Internationalisation 
Overall, then, armed conflicts have become more 
protracted and often defy resolution through political 
negotiations. The fragility of states in combination 
with transnational organised crime is considered to 
be a cause, along with the presence of jihadi groups 
in conflicts and the internationalisation of civil wars. 
Growing criminal markets and the increasing flow 
of illicit goods not only change the overall political 
economy of conflicts, but obviously also facilitate 
access to weapons, funding and recruits.60 This results 
in relatively constant challenges for security policy. 
In the broader security-policy debate, the impact of 
climate change, urbanisation, digitalisation and epi-
demics also plays a role. 
Whatever reasons may have been decisive in indi-
vidual cases, the past few years have once again seen 
clear changes, not least due to the intensified and 
increasingly regionalised wars in Syria and Iraq, as 
well as the conflict in Ukraine. Having decreased 
since the 1990s, the number of armed conflicts has 
risen again. In 2014 there were more than at any 
point since 1999. The intensity of armed conflicts has 
also increased again. While it was primarily the war 
in Syria that made 2014 the most deadly year with 
regard to warfare since the end of the Cold War, even 
without it 2014 would have witnessed the most cas-
ualties since 2000, primarily due to the conflicts in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Ukraine and 
South Sudan.61 Despite a reduction in the number 
of deaths from organised violence in 2015 and 2016, 
these were still the fourth-highest for the entire 
period 1989 to 2016. 
 
form of war. See Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Postmoderne Krieg-
führung. In der Grauzone zwischen Begrenzung und Ent-
grenzung kollektiver Gewalt”, S+F Sicherheit und Frieden 34, 
no. 2 (2016): 97–164 (98). 
59 See the interview with Herfried Münkler, “Die gemeine 
Waffe”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 April 2015. 
60 Von Einsiedel et al., Civil War Trends and the Changing 
Nature of Armed Conflict (see note 46), 2–5. 
61 Pettersson and Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts,  
1946–2014” (see note 41), 539. 
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The proportion of intrastate conflicts 
with external involvement has 
recently become the highest ever 
since World War Two. 
The increased internationalisation of intrastate 
conflicts is also striking. In 2014, a third of armed 
conflicts involved troops from other countries sup-
porting one or even several sides.62 Such constella-
tions already existed in the Cold War, for instance in 
the so-called proxy wars. However, the share of intra-
state conflicts with external involvement has recently 
become the highest ever since World War Two.63 Ex-
ternal military involvement not only prolongs con-
flicts and drives up casualty numbers; it also increas-
ingly blurs the line between intrastate and interstate 
conflicts, as the report by the High-Level Independent 
Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) found in 2015. 
A political solution thus recedes even further.64 
2nd Dimension: The International Political 
and Legal Context 
The mandating of Bundeswehr operations abroad is 
embedded in both international politics and inter-
national law. There are fundamental shifts in inter-
national relations, which have clear consequences 
for German politicians’ decision-making and room for 
manoeuvre. 
Changes in the International Peace Order 
The most momentous recent normative development 
is the so-called responsibility to protect (R2P), a concept 
codified in 2005 to protect people against serious vio-
lations of human rights and international law. States 
have long been obliged under international law to 
protect their populations from the worst human-
rights violations. However, the responsibility to pro-
tect goes further: it implies a declaration of intent on 
the part of states to intervene following authorisation 
 
62 Ibid., 537. 
63 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Armed Conflict by Type, 
1946–2015, http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/595/c_595102-
l_1-k_type.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
64 United Nations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, 
Partnerships, and People, Report of the High-Level Independent 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 16 June 2015, 
http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
08/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
by the UN Security Council – including by military 
means – wherever a state is not in a position or not 
willing to meet its own responsibility to protect. This 
is not the place to discuss the status of R2P as an 
international law standard in the making.65 A much 
more politically charged issue is the extent to which 
R2P, following its politically controversial (and for 
some observers abusive) use during the Libya conflict, 
can still be applied to legitimise the international 
community in military crisis management. 
Many observers insist on the fact that R2P should 
not primarily be considered a means of legitimising 
military action and that it has therefore lost much 
traction due to the intervention in Libya. Some re-
searchers emphasise instead the moderate progress 
made by the international community in dealing with 
crises in the Central African Republic or Mali, and 
warn against wholly rejecting R2P as a norm. They 
are cautiously optimistic that the responsibility to 
protect still offers a basis for the international com-
munity to act.66 
The German government has shown some reti-
cence. On the one hand, it committed itself to R2P in 
its report on the collaboration between Germany and 
the UN in 2013 and 2014, and supports its conceptual 
development as a member of the “Group of Friends of 
R2P”. On the other hand, the responsibility to protect 
does not warrant a single mention in the 2016 White 
Paper – in contrast with the 2006 White Paper, which 
still assumed that it would have a long-term impact 
on the mandating of international peace operations. 
At the very least, R2P has been compromised as a 
legitimising basis. 
However, certain UN member states have always 
had strong reservations about the (potential) infringe-
ment of national sovereignty, which limited the scope 
for action. Some members have also long questioned 
both the extended conflict management set out in the 
1992 Agenda for Peace by the then-UN Secretary Gen-
 
65 For such a discussion, see e.g. Lars Brozus and Christian 
Schaller, Über die Responsibility to Protect zum Regimewechsel, 
SWP-Studie 13/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, June 2013). 
66 See the following special issues for an extensive survey 
of the responsibility to protect: International Politics 53, vol. 1 
(2016): Special Issue “The Responsibility to Protect. Ten Years 
On from the World Summit” and: International Spectator 51, 
vol. 2 (2016): “Special Issue on the Responsibility to Protect”. 
The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, ed. Alex J. 
Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford, 2016), is also comprehen-
sive. 
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eral Boutros-Ghali and the overriding guiding prin-
ciple of “liberal peace”. From the point of view of 
fundamentally critical researchers, R2P and the 
Agenda for Peace are expressions of Western-domi-
nated international decision-making, which at best 
integrates local actors and perspectives from conflict 
zones only superficially.67 More moderate critics 
emphasise that hopes in the 1990s for a rapid con-
solidation of peace through political and economic 
liberalisation were exaggerated and partly misguided, 
but they advocate reforming rather than abandoning 
the approach.68 The academic debate has continued 
in many political forums and via exchanges with 
practitioners; however, no clearly defined alternative 
to the liberal guiding principle has emerged. 
Growing Antagonism in the 
UN Security Council 
For the Bundeswehr to participate in a multilateral 
military operation that is carried out as part of a col-
lective security system, it needs a mandate from the 
UN Security Council. In each case, the process of 
issuing a mandate was and is heavily politicised due 
to the specific political interests and constraints of the 
states involved, or their willingness to secure com-
mon action via the UN or under its authorization.69 
In this context, the permanent Security Council mem-
bers’ willingness to cooperate is a prerequisite. 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to generate 
such willingness given the opposed interests that 
have been noticeable since 2014, especially between 
the US, France and the UK on the one side and Russia 
or China on the other. These are ostensibly triggered 
by tensions caused by the territorial revisionism of 
Russia’s foreign policy, which manifested itself par-
ticularly in the annexation of Crimea in 2014.70 
 
67 Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, “The Local 
Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace”, Third 
World Quarterly 34, no. 5 (2013): 763–83 (763f.). 
68 Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding”, Review of 
International Studies 36 (2010): 337–65 (362). 
69 See in general: Matthias Wolfram, Entscheidungsprozesse 
im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen. Die Mandatierung von 
Militäreinsätzen, The United Nations and Global Change, vol. 6 
(Baden-Baden, 2012). 
70 In addition, two further varieties of this revisionism can 
be seen in international relations: an institutional revision-
ism targeting the fundamental modification or abolition of 
existing institutions, and a normative revisionism pursuing 
the same goal with international norms. 
However, behind the tensions lie different normative 
and power-political conceptions of order and organi-
sation, which concern both the international system 
as a whole and several of its regional branches.71 
The Security Council has ultimately agreed to con-
tinue existing UN missions and missions with a UN 
mandate that are carried out by a regional organisa-
tion, for instance the NATO operation Resolute Sup-
port in Afghanistan. The latter was extended by the 
Security Council in December 2014, immediately 
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and several times 
since. Nevertheless, there is cause for concern that the 
opposing conceptions of political order held by Secu-
rity Council members might paralyse the UN’s com-
mitment to peacekeeping measures in new crises and 
conflicts. From Germany’s perspective, the absence 
of legitimisation through the Security Council could 
restrict options for action. 
Ad-Hoc Coalitions: A Way Out? 
Ad-hoc coalitions are alliances of convenience formed 
on a specific occasion with one objective: solving or 
at least containing a specific security policy issue out-
side of fixed institutional formats. Such informal co-
operation is nothing new, even in the military arena. 
However, Germany’s only example before 2015 – the 
contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 
concluded in 2010 – had at least a legitimising con-
nection to an established system of collective security. 
The mandate for this operation combating trans-
national Islamist terrorism after the attacks of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 drew its legal basis from article 51 of 
the UN Charter as well as, inter alia, from article 5 of 
the NATO Treaty, which the North Atlantic Council 
activated the following day.72 Ultimately, however, a 
 
71 See for representative treatments of the current debate 
on the future of the international order: Amitav Acharya, 
“After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World 
Order”, Ethics & International Affairs 31, no. 3 (2017): 271–85; 
Guy De Jonquières, “The World Turned Upside Down. The 
Decline of the Rules-based International System and the Rise 
of Authoritarian Nationalism”, International Politics 54, no. 5 
(2017): 552–60; Matthew D. Stephen, “Emerging Powers and 
Emerging Trends in Global Governance”, Global Governance 
23, no. 3 (2017): 483–502. 
72 See German Bundestag, 14th legislative period, Antrag der 
Bundesregierung. Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der 
Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe 
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so-called coalition of the willing carried out this 
operation outside of NATO’s command structure.73 
Recently, such forms of cooperation have become 
more regular. The main reasons are the latest power-
political changes and institutional frictions: the UK’s 
looming exit from the European Union, which has 
weakened the community; the decreasing willingness 
of the US to embrace its traditional global leadership 
role; and the political return or ascent of other inter-
national actors. These have all created doubts over 
the effectiveness of the existing multilateral struc-
tures for consultation and decision-making. 
Furthermore, a regional diversification of security 
threats, norms and standards as well as preferences in 
conflict management has been noticeable for years.74 
It is no coincidence, for example, that ad-hoc coali-
tions play a greater role in conflicts in the Middle 
East. Given regional and international interconnec-
tions, which are increasingly including the support 
by individual states for local parties within a conflict, 
informal forms of military cooperation are seen by a 
growing number of countries as an extension of their 
own scope for action and in some cases as the only 
remaining option.75 
This trend is already evident in Bundeswehr opera-
tions abroad as well. Since December 2015, the Ger-
man government has been using a similar constella-
tion to OEF in its support for the anti-IS coalition. The 
mandate for this operation is based on the support 
clause in article 42 paragraph 7 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU), and thus still refers to a sys-
tem of collective security according to Germany’s 
Basic Law. However, it has no operational implica-
tions since the operation is led by the Combined Joint 
Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), 
under US command. 
 
der Resolution 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der 
Vereinten Nationen, Document 14/729, 7 November 2001. 
73 See Christian Freuding, “Die Operation Enduring 
Freedom und Active Endeavour. Deutschlands militärischer 
Beitrag zum Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus”, 
in Armee im Einsatz. Grundlagen, Strategien und Ergebnisse einer 
Beteiligung der Bundeswehr, ed. Hans J. Gießmann and Arnim 
Wagner, Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden, vol. 191 (Baden-
Baden, 2009), 340–52. 
74 See e.g. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and 
Pamela Aall, “The Mosaic of Conflict Management”, in: Rewir-
ing Regional Security in a Fragmented World, ed. idem (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2011), 3–24. 
75 See the remarks on ad-hoc coalitions in the 2016 White 
Paper (see note 29), 81ff. 
The associated training support for Northern Iraq 
has a different legal basis: It rests on a bilateral agree-
ment between Berlin and Baghdad. Nevertheless, the 
Bundeswehr participates in it together with interna-
tional partners, again under the aegis of CJTF-OIR.76 
The operation does not have a UN Security Council 
mandate, the Council’s presidency having merely 
appealed for the operation in a declaration. The anti-
IS coalition is thus a coalition of the willing under US 
leadership. 
There is a tendency towards the legal 
and operational differentiation of 
military operations abroad. 
Overall, what we see is a tendency towards the 
legal and operational differentiation of military 
operations abroad. Operations that have been clearly 
legitimised under the UN Charter stand alongside 
those justified on other grounds. Deployments in 
ad-hoc coalitions complement those that take place 
within the framework of traditional multilateral 
formats for action. 
3rd Dimension: Institutional Framework 
and Partnerships 
Customarily, the Bundeswehr’s military operations 
abroad are conducted as per the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Constitutional Court, within the framework 
and rules of a system of collective security under 
article 24 paragraph 2 of Germany’s Basic Law (GG).77 
This encompasses operations within the established 
multilateral formats of German security and defence 
policy – UN, NATO or EU – which have, as a rule, 
been given the relevant UN Security Council man-
date.78 While exceptions to this rule have been on the 
 
76 See on these two operations Rayk Hähnlein, Die deutsche 
Militärbeteiligung am Kampf gegen den “Islamischen Staat”(IS). War-
um die deutschen Mandate den künftigen Erfordernissen nur bedingt 
genügen, SWP-Aktuell 72/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, November 2016). 
77 See article 24 para 2 GG: “With a view to maintaining 
peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual 
collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limi-
tations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and 
secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of 
the world.” 
78 This is not the place to debate whether or not the EU is 
a system of collective security. While the German Constitu-
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rise, linking military action to multilateral formats 
continues to be a cornerstone of Germany’s security 
policy. 
The Evolution of UN Peace Operations 
The United Nations continue to be the largest deployer 
of peacekeeping troops. In early 2018, more than 
80,000 blue-helmet soldiers were deployed to 15 dif-
ferent peacekeeping missions.79 Alongside the tradi-
tional providers of troops – India, Pakistan, Nepal 
and Bangladesh – various African countries now 
contribute large contingents, including Ethiopia, 
Rwanda and Egypt. By far the greatest number of 
the blue helmets is also deployed in Africa. 
China’s commitment to UN peacekeeping illus-
trates the world’s changed power configurations and 
associated ambitions to engage and shape missions. 
After some reservation, Beijing now provides the 
(quantitatively) largest contribution of all the per-
manent members of the Security Council with over 
2,500 soldiers, and complements this active support 
by making available so-called high-value assets, such 
as a helicopter unit in Darfur.80 A number of Western 
nations have only returned to UN peacekeeping after 
years of reticence81 – first and foremost Italy with 
1,120 soldiers (as of 30 April 2018). 
German security policy might well also have new 
emphases: in the coming years, Bundeswehr deploy-
ments abroad as part of UN-led operations might be 
used more frequently and more substantially as an 
instrument than in the past. The main reason is the 
increasing willingness of the German government to 
 
tional Court explicitly characterises both the UN and NATO 
(and the Western European Union [WEU], disbanded in 
2011) as systems of collective security, it was rather reticent 
in its decision on the Lisbon Treaty to assess the EU with a 
view to the CSDP. However, large swathes of the most recent 
legal literature clearly tend towards characterising the EU as 
a system of collective security under article 24 para 2 GG. 
See Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, 
Die EU als System gegenseitiger kollektiver Sicherheit (Berlin, 2016). 
79 United Nations Peacekeeping Data, https://peacekeeping. 
un.org/en/data-0 (accessed 23 March 2018). 
80 See Courtney J. Fung, China’s Troop Contributions to UN 
Peacekeeping, USIP Peacebrief 212 (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace [USIP], 2016). 
81 Joachim A. Koops and Giulia Tercovich, “A European 
Return to United Nations Peacekeeping? Opportunities, 
Challenges and Ways Ahead”, International Peacekeeping 23, 
no. 5 (2016): 597–609. 
take on responsibility in this policy area.82 The Bun-
deswehr’s most extensive operation abroad at the 
present time – its contribution of up to 1,000 sol-
diers to MINUSMA – illustrates this tendency.83 
Correspondingly, the evolution of the UN doctrine 
for peace operations has great significance for Ger-
many as well. The relevant fundamental documents 
are the Brahimi report from 2000,84 the so-called Cap-
stone Doctrine from 2008,85 and especially the HIPPO 
recommendations submitted in June 2015. 
This extensive inventory of UN peace operations, 
requested by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in 
2014, documents the extent to which the challenges 
have changed.86 Its authors advocate fundamental 
 
82 For examples of this reasoning, see Daniel Maier, “Mehr 
deutsches Personal für Friedenseinsätze der Vereinten Natio-
nen”, PeaceLab 2016, http://www.peacelab2016.de/ peacelab 
2016/debatte/friedenseinsaetze/article/mehr-deutsches-
personal-fuer-friedenseinsaetze-der-vereinten-nationen 
(accessed 23 March 2018); Max Weckemann, “UN stärken – 
auch militärisch”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 29 December 2015; 
Joachim A. Koops, “Germany and United Nations Peace-
keeping: The Cautiously Evolving Contributor”, International 
Peacekeeping 23, no. 5 (2016): 652–80. 
83 See German Bundestag, 18th legislative period, Antrag 
der Bundesregierung. Fortsetzung und Erweiterung der Beteiligung 
bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an der Multidimensionalen Inte-
grierten Stabilisierungsmission der Vereinten Nationen in Mali 
(MINUSMA) auf Grundlage der Resolutionen 2100 (2013), 2164 
(2014), 2227 (2015) und 2295 (2016) des Sicherheitsrates der 
Vereinten Nationen, 25 April 2013, 25 June 2014, 29 June 2015 
and 29 June 2016, Document 18/10819, 11 January 2017. 
84 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations, 17 August 2000, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ 
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305 (accessed 23 March 2018). 
85 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 
Principles and Guidelines (New York, 2008), http://www.un.org/ 
en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf (accessed 
23 March 2018). 
86 See United Nations, Uniting Our Strengths for Peace 
(see note 64). Developments in the operations doctrine and 
reform efforts had already been documented and advanced 
between 2000 and 2015. See e.g.: United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations. Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine) (New 
York, 2008); United Nations Department of Field Support, 
Global Field Support Strategy 2010–2015. Overview of Context, 
Objectives, Results and Lessons Learned (New York, 2015); United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/United 
Nations Department of Field Support, A New Partnership 
Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (New York, 
2009); United Nations, General Assembly, Civilian Capacity 
in the Aftermath of Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General. 
A/66/311–S/2011/527 (New York, 19 August 2011). 
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modifications in four areas. First, they emphasise the 
primacy of politics: peace operations must be part of 
a comprehensive political strategy. Second, member 
states should utilise the whole spectrum of peace 
operations, from small political presences to large 
multidimensional missions. Third, the authors call 
for better collaboration with regional partners for 
peace and security, and fourth for making the future 
work of the UN Secretariat and the operations them-
selves more “field-focused” and “people-centred”. The 
HIPPO report recommendations do not provide an 
entirely new field map of peace operations. However, 
the document does make clear the broad spectrum of 
functions of UN peace operations.87 
Overall, the Brahimi Report from 2000 and the 
2015 HIPPO report captured the need for conceptual 
and structural reforms of UN peace missions. Never-
theless, many of their recommendations have still not 
been (fully) implemented. However, shortly after Sec-
retary-General Guterres assumed office, he initiated 
structural reforms in the peace and security archi-
tecture that also addressed some of the HIPPO recom-
mendations. The priority of these ongoing projects – 
along with improving the overall performance of 
operations – is prevention.88 
Since the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions 
have become more robust and multidimensional: 
police components play a greater role; more attention 
is paid to promoting the rule of law; and mandated 
tasks, such as protecting civilians and extending the 
state’s authority, signal significant adaptations to 
today’s primarily intrastate conflicts and current mis-
sion contexts. With regard to robustness, critical 
debates have recently emerged on its limits and the 
use of force within the context of such operations.89 
The continually extended tasks portfolio of multi-
dimensional missions has also met with criticism – 
especially where there is a gap between the ambition 
 
87 On the efforts to implement elements of the HIPPO 
report, see Tobias von Gienanth, Wibke Hansen and Alischa 
Kugel, Making Reform Reality – Enabling Change for United 
Nations Peace Operations, ZIF Background Paper (Berlin: ZIF, 
2016). 
88 On the concrete plans for reforms to the “Peace and 
Security Pillar” and the associated management reforms, 
see Tanja Bernstein, Reforming the United Nation’s Peace and 
Security Pillar, ZIF Policy Briefing (Berlin: ZIF, December 2017). 
89 See Peter Rudolf, VN-Friedensmissionen und der Einsatz mili-
tärischer Gewalt, SWP-Studie 18/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, September 2017). 
of a mandate and the reality of its implementation. 
In previous decades, the UN Security Council has 
formulated mandates that are ever more extensive 
and differentiated and thus ever more demanding – 
to the point of overload. 
An example is the development of the UN mission 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). 
When the task of protecting civilians was added to 
the original key focus on monitoring the 1999 Lusaka 
ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops, it forced UN 
soldiers to assume a more robust role due to the on-
going violence in the east of the country. This culmi-
nated in the setting up of a force intervention brigade 
as part of MONUSCO, which has a mandate to use 
violence offensively and the objective of “neutralis-
ing” militias. 
In Mali the Security Council deployed a multidi-
mensional stabilisation mission, MINUSMA, from the 
outset. Apart from supporting the ceasefire agree-
ments and the peace agreement of 2015, protecting 
the population and re-establishing the state’s author-
ity over the whole Malian territory are among its 
tasks. Both missions are also examples of how opera-
tions continuously evolve simply due to requirements 
in the field, and how procedures have to be adapted, 
for instance when dealing with non-state violent 
actors or asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and 
organised crime. The effect of the reviews of ongoing 
multidimensional peacekeeping missions initiated 
by the Secretary-General and the structural reforms 
of the UN peace and security architecture remains to 
be seen. 
The EU’s Crisis Operations 
In the context of the multiple crises within Europe, 
aspirations for the Common Security and Defence 
Policy have become more modest over time compared 
with the intentions of the 1990s. While the EU has 
long had the political and military institutions neces-
sary for crisis management, the high political expec-
tations could only be met selectively. Prevailing 
reservations by member states as regards deepening 
political cooperation and integration are mainly re-
sponsible. Nevertheless, despite aspirations of sover-
eignty and the evident prioritisation of domestic 
issues by many EU member states, diametrically 
opposed tendencies co-exist. 
First of all, since the summer of 2017, increased 
cooperation within the CSDP has gained momentum. 
Three developments were decisive: the reaction to the 
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UK’s decision to leave the EU; the impression that US 
security commitments were in doubt under President 
Trump; and the adoption of the EU’s new Security 
Strategy. Many EU members are cautiously discarding 
their previous security and defence-policy reticence, 
which is reflected above all in the establishment of a 
new planning unit to carry out military CSDP mis-
sions, in the coordinated development of respective 
national capabilities, and in the creation of a Euro-
pean defence fund.90 Furthermore, there is the new 
PRISM unit (“Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/ SSR, 
Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation”) at 
the European External Action Service, which is meant 
to promote the integrated approach to crises and con-
flicts. PRISM will also be responsible for operationalis-
ing stabilising actions under article 28 (1) of the Lis-
bon Treaty.91 
Moreover, the EU has engaged ever more frequently 
in crisis management, albeit incrementally. The EU 
Battle Groups, which have existed since 2005 and 
been ready for deployment since 2007, have not yet 
been deployed. But there have been several individual 
peace operations since EUFOR Concordia in Macedo-
nia in 2003: a rather impressive total of 16 missions 
until mid-2017 (of which six military and ten civilian 
ones) with over 4,000 operatives.92 These missions 
tend to be limited in both time and function, and 
revolve mainly around conflict management using 
civilian, police and military means. The CSDP’s mili-
tary operations currently consist of two maritime 
missions in the Mediterranean and around the Horn 
of Africa, and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As for the size and scope of European missions, their 
regional focus is on the eastern and particularly the 
extended southern EU neighbourhood. This tendency 
of regional prioritisation is likely to increase in the 
coming years, though it remains unclear to what 
extent military missions will take precedence. The 
EU’s support for the G5 Sahel Joint Force – which 
 
90 See in detail Olaf Wientzek, Hoffnungsschimmer für die 
Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU, KAS Ana-
lysen & Argumente 236 (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
[KAS], 2017). 
91 For an overview of more recent developments, see 
Tobias Pietz, Flexibilisierung und “Stabilisierungsaktionen”: 
EU-Krisenmanagement ein Jahr nach der globalen Strategie, ZIF 
Policy Briefing (Berlin: ZIF, September 2017). 
92 ZIF, Peace Operations 2017/2018 (as of June 2017), http:// 
www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/ 
veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_World_Map_Peace_Operations_ 
2017.pdf (accessed 15 December 2017). 
brings together troops from Mali, Mauretania, Niger, 
Burkina Faso and Chad in the transnational fight 
against terrorism, drug and human trafficking – 
seems to indicate that it intends to continue priori-
tising the enabling of partners.93 
It is currently doubtful that the EU’s ambitions in 
this area can be extended in the near future. If the 
Union wants to increase its effectiveness in crisis 
management, it is hard to see how it can avoid deep-
ening political integration in this policy area in the 
long term. This is likely, however, to meet with sub-
stantial resistance from individual EU member states. 
The Development of NATO 
Crisis Management 
During the Balkan wars in the 1990s, NATO turned 
from a hesitant United Nations subcontractor into 
an active military-political actor. Since then, the spec-
trum of NATO operations has ranged from robust 
peacekeeping missions to maritime peace operations, 
training missions, humanitarian relief operations in 
emergencies, missions to support other organisations, 
and contributions to counterterrorism. The Alliance 
emphasised the latter through its formal accession 
to the anti-IS coalition during the NATO summit in 
Brussels on 25 May 2017. For some time, there have 
also been missions in the complex area of “post-con-
flict peacebuilding” following intrastate conflicts. 
NATO now focuses on reactivating 
and expanding its collective 
defence capacities. 
No serious operational changes for the Bundes-
wehr’s ongoing operations abroad are unfolding at 
the level of NATO. NATO currently leads two larger 
missions abroad on behalf of the United Nations: 
KFOR in Kosovo (February 2018: 4,030 soldiers) and 
the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan 
(September 2017: 13,500 soldiers). Further sizeable 
commitments are currently not planned, except for a 
 
93 For further details, see European Commission, Annex 2 
of the Commission Decision of 1 August 2017, amending Commission 
Decision C(2017) 2579 of 27 April 2017 on the 2017–2018 Action 
Programme of the African Peace Facility in Favour of the African 
Union Commission and Allocating Funds of the African Peace Facility 
from the 11th European Development Fund for the Support to the G5 
Sahel Joint Force, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/ 
2017/EN/C-2017-5291-F1-EN-ANNEX-2-PART-1.PDF (accessed 23 
March 2018). 
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repeatedly discussed capacity-building mission to Iraq 
and the recently agreed upsizing of RSM in Afghani-
stan to 16,000 soldiers, including up to 1,300 German 
soldiers. The modest political accomplishments of 
international action in Afghanistan and the resulting 
intervention fatigue as well as the Russian annexa-
tion of Crimea or ongoing destabilisation of the Don-
bas have led to a shift in priorities. NATO now focuses 
on reactivating and expanding its collective defence 
capacities, and on reassurance measures for its mem-
bers in Central and Eastern Europe. 
In its Warsaw Summit declaration of July 2016, 
NATO once again confirmed its cooperation with the 
UN (a necessity it has accepted since the NATO Coun-
cil declaration of 1992), and described it as ever more 
important. It also re-emphasised its commitment to 
increasing support for UN peace missions. This con-
cerns, inter alia, measures against explosive devices, 
to improve training and deployability, to relocate UN 
troops and to cooperate in defence capacity-building 
in at-risk countries.94 NATO has also offered the Afri-
can Union a closer partnership, which might range 
from operational and logistical support via coopera-
tion in capacity-building to supporting the African 
Standby Force through conception, training and exer-
cises. However, such forms of cooperation aim to pro-
vide selective support rather than comprehensive 
NATO-led missions. 
The Increasing Military Integration 
in Europe 
There is one development that concerns both EU-led 
and NATO-led Bundeswehr operations abroad: mili-
tary integration in Europe. This will inevitably bring 
lasting change not only to the military framework, 
but also to the political framework of German mili-
tary deployments abroad. Since the mid-1990s, the 
countries of the Euro-Atlantic area have consistently 
expanded their military cooperation and pushed for-
ward with integrating their armed forces. It is worth 
noting, however, that forms of cooperation and levels 
of commitment do (still) vary. 
First of all, there is NATO’s integrated command 
structure and its joint reconnaissance and command 
 
94 NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué. Issued by the Heads 
of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8–9 July 2016, para 120, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm 
(accessed 23 March 2018). 
capabilities, which require a high degree of coopera-
tion commitment from all involved. The permanent 
integrated command structure gives the alliance a 
unique reservoir of permanently available reconnais-
sance, planning and command capabilitities, which 
are crucial for political decision-making and control 
within NATO. In recent years, this capacity has been 
complemented by a specific form of cooperation – 
the “framework nation” concept – under which par-
ticipating countries align their joint new projects and 
capacity-building with the objectives of NATO’s de-
fence-planning process. The respective framework 
nation takes on greater responsibility compared with 
other cooperating countries by, inter alia, making 
available larger formations and ensuring coordination 
within the capability cluster (submarine warfare, anti-
missile defence, etc.) and with NATO.95 
Second, many governments have initiated various 
multinational cooperation projects under the concep-
tual keywords pooling and sharing. The pooling approach 
is characterised by bringing together the capabilities 
of several nations for joint optimal use and manage-
ment. However, the capabilities contributed by each 
nation remain under national control with regard to 
concrete operations – as they do in the framework 
nation concept. The gain for those involved therefore 
initially consists of an opportunity for flexible – but 
not necessarily reliable – access to capabilities that 
far exceed each individual contribution. Military ad-
vantages can also occur, for instance through more 
interoperability.96 
In sharing, the situation is somewhat similar. Here, 
one or several states make a binding commitment to 
make capabilities available for joint use. In the con-
text of operations abroad, this form of cooperation is 
more momentous because it concerns state sovereignty 
in three ways. One, the prerequisite for sharing is that 
the state making a capability available is actually 
 
95 See Rainer L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe, Ambitious Frame-
work Nation: Germany in NATO. Bundeswehr Capability Planning 
and the “Framework Nations Concept”, SWP Comment 35/2017 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2017), 
4f.; Erhard Bühler, “Die europäisch abgestimmte Fähigkeits-
planung. Instrumente der Streitkräftekooperation wie das 
Rahmennationenkonzept und Pesco müssen synergetisch 
eingesetzt werden”, Die Bundeswehr. Zeitschrift des Deutschen 
Bundeswehrverbandes (February 2018), 14f. 
96 See Henrik Heidenkamp, “Die strategische Notwendig-
keit von Pooling & Sharing”, in Europa als Sicherheitspolitischer 
Akteur, ed. Dan Krause and Michael Staack (Opladen, 2014), 
233–51. 
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willing to restrict its own control in a specific crisis 
situation in favour of another state. Two, when 
several countries jointly make a capability available, 
it is difficult to say how each individual country’s 
right of disposal relates to that of the others. And 
finally, with changing political priorities it is some-
what uncertain whether third states can rely on the 
firmly committed capabilities of the other states. 
The UK’s looming exit from the European Union 
and the Trump government’s Europe policy have 
given momentum to military integration in Europe. 
However, this dynamic is no longer accompanied by 
the idea that the CSDP could be developed “top-
down”, in other words, that far-reaching ambitions 
and conceptions of political order could drive policy. 
Rather, it will be developed “bottom-up”, meaning 
that it will grow incrementally through building joint 
capabilities and institutions. In this context, numer-
ous bilateral and multilateral cooperation projects 
have been initiated in the past few months. It is likely 
that these will expand in the coming years and fur-
ther “denationalise” the Bundeswehr’s operational 
readiness. The German Bundestag may therefore soon 
be faced with the question of whether national con-
trol over multinational military capabilities needs to 
be generally modified if these approaches are to prove 
successful.97 
Partnerships 
The increased complexity of armed conflicts means 
that, with growing frequency, peace operations with 
different mandates or under different leadership are 
in the field at the same time. In Mali, for example, 
there are two CSDP missions along with the UN mis-
sion MINUSMA, which took over the tasks of the Afri-
can-led support mission AFISMA in 2013: the military 
training mission EUTM Mali and the civilian mission 
EUCAP Sahel Mali. In addition, since 2014 France has 
deployed 3,000 soldiers in Mali and four other Sahel 
countries for counter-terorrism purposes as part of 
Operation Barkhane. In July 2017, to relieve this 
operation and support MINUSMA, the Joint Force offi-
cially began its duty during a G5 Sahel Summit in 
 
97 For details on individual proposals, see Ekkehard Brose, 
When Germany Sends Troops Abroad. The Case for a Limited Reform 
of the Parliamentary Participation Act, SWP Research Paper 
9/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 
2013). 
Bamako attended by President Macron.98 The EU pro-
vides 100 million euros in financial support to the 
force.99 Finally, the EU plans to send a stabilising mis-
sion to Mali for the first time under article 28 of the 
Lisbon Treaty. This small civilian presence, named EU 
Stabilisation Action in Mopti and Segou (EUSTAMS), 
will primarily help with the rebuilding of adminis-
trative structures. 
The multitude of parallel operations 
leads to more complex decision-
making structures. 
Such a multitude of parallel operations leads to 
ever more complex decision-making structures, and 
increases the need to synchronise and coordinate. 
Questions also arise as to how the region’s population 
perceives the different operations, what their joint 
situation report is, and how it should be assessed. The 
traditional military tenets of unity of effort and unity of 
command risk falling by the wayside in these parallel 
operations.100 Nevertheless, even if the problem of 
coordinating parallel operations has not been com-
prehensively solved either conceptually or practically, 
progress has certainly been made in institutionalising 
cooperation, for instance between the UN and EU or 
UN and AU.101 
Since 2003, the EU has continuously expanded 
its strategic partnership with the United Nations in 
peacekeeping and crisis management. Since 2012, 
it has implemented a corresponding action plan to 
improve support for UN peacekeeping missions, 
which both sides then updated along with priorities 
 
98 See also United Nations, Security Council Resolution, 
S/RES/2359 (2017), 21 June 2017, http://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/594d1dc14.html (accessed 23 March 2018). 
99 European Commission, “EU Mobilises the International 
Community for Africa’s Sahel Region”, press release (Brus-
sels, 23 February 2018). 
100 See e.g. Rainer Glatz, “International Assistance Force 
(ISAF) – Erfahrungen im Afghanistan-Einsatz”, in Am Hindu-
kusch – und weiter? Die Bundeswehr im Auslandseinsatz: Erfahrun-
gen, Bilanzen, Ausblicke, ed. Rainer Glatz and Rolf Tophoven, 
Schriftenreihe, vol. 1584 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für poli-
tische Bildung, 2015), 67f. 
101 See Joachim A. Koops and Thierry Tardy, “The UN’s 
Inter-organizational Relations: Advancements and Achieve-
ments”, in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations (Oxford, 2015), 60–77. 
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for the period 2015 to 2018.102 In its Global Strategy 
of June 2016, the EU re-affirmed its cooperation with 
the UN. The Strategy focuses inter alia on the EU’s 
role at the onset of a crisis to bridge the critical period 
until a UN mission has been set up and reached its 
operational capacity in situ.103 
Nevertheless, EU member states clearly still prefer 
to negotiate with the UN directly rather than let the 
EU indicate, let alone provide, their capabilities. Due 
to the overlap of membership, this similarly holds 
true for NATO. In many European capitals, UN peace-
keeping missions are being rediscovered as effective 
instruments for crisis management due to their long-
term stabilising impact.104 Somewhat representative 
of this development are the UK and the Netherlands: 
after years of “abstinence”, London deployed 100 sol-
diers to the UN Operation in South Sudan (UNMISS) in 
autumn 2016 while in 2014 the Netherlands had sent 
450 soldiers to Mali. This policy area is also undergo-
ing a renaissance among other European partners, 
such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden, albeit to a 
lesser extent. However, one could hardly describe 
the member states’ support for the UN in this area as 
forceful enough to suggest it is a political priority – 
especially since there continue to be some suspicions 
over the effectiveness of UN command and control 
structures. The desire to retain (national) autonomy 
as regards decision-making processes and conducting 
operations also plays a part. 
 
102 See Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, EU–UN Cooperation in Peace-
keeping and Crisis Management, European Parliamentary 
Research Service Briefing (November 2015), http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/ReData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572783/EPRS_ 
BRI(2015)572783_EN.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
103 See EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action (see note 31), 25: 
“CSDP could assist further and complement UN peacekeep-
ing through bridging, stabilisation or other operations. The 
EU will also enhance synergy with UN peacebuilding efforts, 
through greater coordination in the planning, evolution and 
withdrawal of CSDP capacity-building missions in fragile 
settings.” 
104 See Koops and Tercovich, “A European Return to 
United Nations Peacekeeping?” (see note 81). 
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These shifts during the past decades have given rise 
to a series of current and specific challenges for Ger-
many’s policy on Bundeswehr operations abroad. 
They concern three fundamental areas: 
∎ the objectives of the operations, or of German 
participation: what does the German government 
hope to achieve in the context, and how can 
operations abroad contribute to these goals? 
∎ alliances and partners: what is the best action 
framework to pursue these goals? 
∎ means of implementation: how can these goals 
be realised most effectively? 
The above order might seem self-evident – in prac-
tice, however, the second or third step is often taken 
before the first, meaning that solicitations from al-
liance partners or the use of certain instruments 
occur before the fundamental objectives have been 
defined. This happens not least because of the often 
very short time lapse between the emergence of a 
military need and the decision on German partici-
pation. In a rapidly changing environment, it is 
therefore crucial to grapple sufficiently early with 
challenges and areas of tension regarding objectives, 
partners and instruments, and to lay down some 
guiding principles for future operations abroad. 
Germany’s position is inevitably influenced by 
the development of conflicts; the perceived urgency 
of the problem; and responsibility arising from obli-
gations under international law, international alli-
ances and political commitments. The objectives set 
for each operation will prioritise these factors dif-
ferently and depend, for instance, on where precisely 
the armed conflict takes place and how great the 
impact is on Germany and Europe. 
The level of ambition of Germany’s foreign and 
security policy and its decision-making concerning 
operations abroad will take their bearings from the 
balance of power in international politics, Germany’s 
own capacities, and specific negotiations in inter-
national forums that take into account its own 
analysis and evaluation of the situation as well as the 
feasibility of a German contribution. The operational 
framework set by UN resolutions makes it difficult to 
formulate one’s own objectives clearly in mandates, 
rather than give descriptions of capacities. Neverthe-
less, even when operations are legitimised by inter-
national law, it is imperative to work towards em-
bedding them in an overall political strategy. The 
associated challenges result from the transformations 
described. 
Normative Anchors for a Viable 
Political Process 
The evaluation of the normative objectives of many 
peace operations – such as support for state-building 
following an armed conflict so as to succeed in a 
democratic transformation – has changed. Today 
more reservation and realism prevail than in the late 
1990s, for example.105 Researchers have for some time 
questioned not only the effectiveness but also the 
legitimacy of promoting liberal democracies and mar-
ket economies in conflict contexts, referencing mainly 
the fact that local actors and ideas are not sufficiently 
taken into account.106 
Political reservations about “liberal peacebuilding” 
have also always existed within the UN Security 
Council. The balance of power and stances have now 
shifted in such a way that it has become markedly 
more difficult to reach a consensus on new or existing 
mandates even just among the five permanent mem-
 
105 See Shahar Hameiri, “The Crisis of Liberal Peacebuild-
ing and the Future of Statebuilding”, International Politics 51, 
no. 3 (2014): 316–33. 
106 For an overview, see Edward Newman, Roland Paris 
and Oliver P. Richmond, “Introduction”, in New Perspectives on 
Liberal Peacebuilding, ed. idem (Tokyo, New York and Paris, 
2009), 3–25. 
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bers of the Security Council (P5). This concerns peace-
keeping missions as much as other forms of conflict 
management or resolution, as demonstrated by the 
failure to reach agreement on a special tribunal for 
war crimes in Syria. The international and regional 
organisations that deploy troops particularly need 
to reflect on what the normative “anchors” of future 
missions might look like, how to reach consensus on 
them, and how to define the politically desired end 
state of each mission using those anchors. 
This is all the more vital because operations – or 
even the decision to launch operations – increasingly 
meet with resistance in the host country.107 Political 
confrontations over ongoing or planned missions or 
troop surges in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Darfur, South Sudan or Burundi are just a few exam-
ples. Following pressure by the Congolese govern-
ment, for instance, the UN was forced to reduce staff 
levels for MONUSCO. The South Sudanese govern-
ment prevented the relocation of the Security-Coun-
cil-mandated Regional Protection Force for a year, and 
the Burundian government has declined the deploy-
ment of 228 police officers, decided in July 2016, to 
support the efforts of the UN Special Adviser. This is 
an expression of diverging agendas: the international 
community can less and less take it for granted that 
the political elites in the country of deployment share 
its goals. After all, along with robust military com-
ponents, today’s peacekeeping missions also encom-
pass programmes on human rights, rule of law, 
security sector reform, and more. 
However, it is not only the implementation of 
peace agreements, but also and especially state-build-
ing and peace-building that are almost impossible 
without the accord of the host country. For robust 
operations, a consensus at the strategic level is also 
indispensable. The question of whether or not a host 
country has given its consent ultimately separates 
robust peacekeeping from peace enforcement.108 A 
brittle consensus is always a political headache. It 
becomes an operational problem when reservations 
about an international mission lead to a worsening of 
the personnel’s security, to limitations of the deployed 
forces’ freedom of movement, and an active under-
mining of the implementation of the mandate – be 
 
107 For an early shaping of this trend in Africa, see Denis 
M. Tull, When They Overstay Their Welcome: UN Peacekeepers in 
Africa, SWP Comment 15/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, June 2010). 
108 See Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding” (see note 68). 
it through detention or arrests, delays or restrictions 
in importing equipment and supplies, or even the 
expulsion of individuals. 
Reaching and maintaining a consensus is ultimately 
tied to the question of whether there is a common 
conception of the desired end state, and whether the 
mission is embedded in a robust political process that 
is sufficiently broad, so that the mission can rely on 
the support of influential member states. 
Coalitions and Action Formats 
The institutional framework for Bundeswehr opera-
tions abroad is unclear, given the difficulty of politi-
cal decision-making in international organisations. 
Observers diagnosed a crisis of multilateralism over a 
decade ago. Where peace operations are concerned, 
this means conflicting tendencies: 
On the one hand, the more recent political shifts 
have pushed even established institutions like the EU 
and NATO into troubled waters. On the other hand, 
there is a noticeable rise of (regional) powers and new 
actor constellations – whether as part of the African 
Peace and Security Architecture or in (sub)regional 
coalitions or loose, non-institutionalised formats. This 
increasing differentiation of action formats offers 
both opportunities and risks. 
From the German perspective, an especially weighty 
issue is whether or not to participate in ad-hoc coali-
tions like the one to fight “Islamic State” in Iraq and 
Syria. Politically, these formats were upgraded in the 
2016 White Paper. However, the German government 
has not yet finally clarified which formats it intends 
to prioritise in future operations abroad. Three impor-
tant aspects of ad-hoc coalitions need to be considered. 
First, political control is non-transparent and the 
operational framework vague. This distinguishes 
ad-hoc coalitions from those in which bodies of multi-
lateral organisations – for example the North Atlan-
tic Council for NATO or the Political and Security 
Committee for the EU – take the helm. As was de-
monstrated by the confrontations over the visiting 
rights of German parliamentarians to the German 
contingent at the Turkish air base Incirlik in 2016, it 
is more difficult for national institutions to exercise 
their right of oversight. 
Second, multilateral cooperation essentially forces 
those involved to coordinate their expectations of the 
political outcome that a specific operation abroad is 
supposed to deliver. Informal coalitions, however, 
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cannot provide these transparency and coordination 
functions. This results in individual coalition mem-
bers (for instance within CJTF-OJR) focusing on 
national interests, with no consensus being reached 
on the politically desired end state. 
Third, there are no agreed procedures for financial 
burden-sharing or provision of military capabilities. 
These have to be renegotiated for every mission. By 
contrast, in multilateral formats there are pre-existing 
agreements and procedures on sharing the financial 
and military burden. 
Ad-hoc coalitions do not deliver 
political control, nor do they 
coordinate the conceptions of 
political order pursued by the 
participating states. 
The central challenge thus consists of preventing 
the above-mentioned “depoliticisation” of such 
operations. Ad-hoc coalitions do not deliver political 
control, nor do they coordinate the conceptions of 
political order pursued by the participating states. 
Nevertheless, it is also obvious that multilateral insti-
tutions such as NATO are increasingly developing into 
platforms for operations with crumbling reliability, 
resulting in a lack of clarity as to which states are 
actually partners in a mission. Depending on political 
interests, only some members will participate along-
side partner countries. The German government can 
therefore no longer automatically assume that the 
UK, France or the Netherlands will also shoulder their 
share of an operation as part of NATO. The alliance’s 
Libya operation illustrates this development: all mem-
bers gave their political agreement, but only 14 NATO 
countries participated operationally. Uncoordinated 
withdrawals of individual partners can also occasion-
ally occur: examples are France and Canada, which 
backed out of the ISAF mission. It is thus less and less 
frequently the case that those who start an operation 
together also finish it together. In other words: the 
political bonding effect of multilateral military action 
is weakening. 
This development has two consequences for Bun-
deswehr operations abroad. One, it complicates oper-
ating in integrated military units, which are likely 
to gain in importance in coming years. Two, the fluc-
tuation makes it even more difficult to reach a last-
ing, viable and politically consistent agreement on 
the objectives which the military deployment should 
or can realise. 
Stabilisation in Conditions of 
Persistent Insecurity 
Armed conflicts are once again increasing in number, 
intensity and degree of internationalisation, whereas 
the UN Security Council’s ability to take decisions is 
currently diminished. Viable and lasting peace agree-
ments will increasingly be difficult to achieve in the 
foreseeable future. Operations have often taken place 
in contexts of incomplete peace settlements. In recent 
years, however, the problem of “no peace to keep” 
has worsened. The intervention of external actors and 
the fragmentation of parties in conflicts seem to be 
the primary causes. In the UN’s largest peacekeeping 
missions – overwhelmingly in African states – the 
peace that the troops are attempting to secure, in 
some cases as successors to missions by other actors 
such as the AU, is often fragile. In these situations, 
the functions of operations are occasionally expanded 
in the direction of peace enforcement, for instance 
when a mission provides offensive military support 
for the respective government against non-state 
armed actors. 
The mandate for the Force Intervention Brigade, 
which constitutes part of the UN mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, entails a new degree 
of robustness in peace operations. It has a mandate to 
neutralise armed militias; the main novelty is that its 
troops have explicitly been given the authority and 
capabilities for offensive action.109 In August 2016, 
the Security Council similarly appended the Regional 
Protection Force to its mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS). Its task is to secure access to the town of 
Juba, protect its airport and other central facilities, 
and respond immediately to attacks against civilians, 
UN personnel, humanitarian actors or UN protection 
sites. It is authorised to use all necessary force.110 
Moreover, its mandate is formulated much more pro-
actively than regular mandates under Chapter VII. 
However, the deployment could not begin for a year 
after the mandate was issued since the South Suda-
nese government withheld its approval. By February 
2018, only a little over 1,000 of the 4,000 mandated 
soldiers were stationed in South Sudan. 
 
109 See Denis M. Tull, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Use 
of Force. The Intervention Brigade in Congo Is No Model for Success, 
SWP Comment 20/2016, (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, April 2016). 
110 United Nations, Security Council Resolution, S/RES/2304 
(2016), 12 August 2016. 
New Challenges for Operations Abroad 
SWP Berlin 
Missions in a Changing World: 
The Bundeswehr and Its Operations Abroad 
September 2018 
34 
The UN-mandated but AU-led mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) is undoubtedly the peace operation with 
the greatest degree of robustness at present. Along 
with the missions in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) and Mali (MINUSMA), observers see these 
operations as a new category of “stabilisation mis-
sion”.111 Such missions increasingly run the risk of 
being perceived as a party to the conflict in their 
country of deployment. There are growing calls for a 
separate doctrine for such operations, which would 
be uncoupled from the classical principles of peace-
keeping – consent, impartiality and non-use of force 
except in self-defence and defence of the mandate112 
– and which would clearly distinguish peacekeeping 
from enforcement peacekeeping. 
This does not involve questioning the principle 
of robust operations as such. In the early 1990s, the 
Security Council started equipping operations with 
the authority to use force under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter to protect them against a worst-case 
scenario. This change was largely based on lessons 
learned from the missions in Somalia and the Bal-
kans. Fundamental reform reports such as the 
Brahimi or HIPPO reports have since confirmed that 
robust peacekeeping is a logical and necessary devel-
opment.113 
This is all the more apt since protecting civilians 
has become one of the key tasks of modern UN peace 
operations. Most missions, however, can barely live 
up to this task. There are rules of thumb for the size 
of a protection force in proportion to the area of 
operation and the population living there in order 
to guarantee such protection.114 Even the large UN 
missions do not come close to this ratio. The question 
 
111 For case studies, see John Karlsrud, “The UN at War: 
Examining the Consequences of Peace Enforcement Man-
dates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the 
DRC and Mali”, Third World Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2015): 40–54. 
112 E.g. Cedric De Coning, “Offensive and Stabilization 
Mandates”, in United Nations Peace Operations: Aligning Principles 
and Practice, ed. Peter Mateja (Oslo, 2015), 17f. 
113 United Nations, General Assembly/Security Council, 
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions in All Their Aspects, Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 
from the Secretary-General to the President of the General 
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, A/55/ 
305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, http://www.un.org/ 
documents/ga/docs/55/a55305.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
114 Paul Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace 
Operations: Insights from Africa, Research Paper no. 1 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2010), 21. 
of how to implement the protection of civilians 
effectively has not yet been sufficiently clarified, 
either conceptually or operationally. Troop-contrib-
uting states are also very reluctant when it comes to 
actually fulfilling a robust mandate. An internal UN 
analysis of the implementation of “Protection of Civil-
ians” emphasises that troop contingents often do not 
act even when the situation requires it.115 
In stabilisation efforts, the military 
component will remain ineffective 
without complementary political and 
financial efforts. 
What options are there for responding to sustained 
violence in cases where no viable peace agreement 
comes about for years? In the past decade, both as 
part and outside of UN peacekeeping, the focus has 
increasingly shifted to stabilisation measures: defus-
ing crises; at the very least containing violence; and 
establishing a minimum of security for the popula-
tion. In contexts such as Mali, the volatile security 
situation in the north of the country means that, 
alongside MINUSMA, there are both the French mis-
sion (Operation Barkhane) and the military EU 
training mission, whose objective is to build up the 
capacities of Mali’s armed forces to guarantee the 
country’s territorial integrity and a secure environ-
ment. The Bundeswehr’s training support for security 
forces in Northern Iraq also fits into the category of 
stabilisation efforts since the mission aimed to “stabi-
lise Iraq in such a way that all population groups 
are appropriately integrated, and to work towards 
the political pacification of Syria, Iraq and the region 
through diplomatic efforts on the international 
stage”.116 As with all stabilisation efforts, the military 
component will remain ineffective without comple-
mentary political and financial efforts. 
Generally, stabilisation measures should be carried 
out by civilian and legitimate local authorities. How-
ever, in particularly adverse settings, the military may 
assume command of international measures – co-
 
115 See United Nations, Evaluation of the Implementation and 
Results of Protection of Civilians Mandates in UN Peacekeeping Opera-
tions. Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 
A/68/787, March 2014, https://oios.un.org/resources/ga_report/ 
a-68-787-dpko.pdf (accessed 23 March 2018). 
116 German Bundestag, Federal Government motion, Aus-
bildungsunterstützung der Sicherheitskräfte der Regierung der Region 
Kurdistan-Irak und der irakischen Streitkräfte, Document 18/3561, 
17 December 2014, 4. 
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ordinating and consulting as closely as possible with 
other actors. It remains an open question how such 
an integrated approach can work in cases where mili-
tary stabilisation, possibly involving a variety of 
military actors, precedes civilian activities. The fun-
damental issue with this kind of scenario is whether 
there can be credible support for an open political 
process when external actors have already de facto 
taken sides. 
Building Partners’ Capacities 
Due to mixed experiences with direct stabilisation 
interventions, an instrument frequently used is build-
ing the capacities of partners in the countries of de-
ployment. As a rule, funding, advice, training and/or 
equipment is meant to enable the state security forces 
to establish and maintain security by themselves. 
These measures can be part of a multidimensional 
mission with a comprehensive mandate for crisis 
management or peacekeeping, or else be assigned to 
indirect subsidiary missions that are solely focusing 
on supporting and enabling local forces. 
Individual Bundeswehr missions are poised be-
tween the two formats, especially the Resolute Sup-
port Mission in Afghanistan, which stems from the 
functional development of this mission over time. 
By contrast, the EU training missions in Mali and 
Somalia can be straightforwardly categorised. Apart 
from providing training for the armed forces they 
give strategic advice to the defence ministries, but 
neither participate in combat nor support military 
operations. The tasks of 14 of the EU’s 16 ongoing 
CSDP missions encompass capacity-building measures 
for the security sector, including the police.117 
Beyond this, there are other – often bilateral – 
formats for advising, training and equipping partners. 
These include the already mentioned German “Enable 
 
117 In late October 2017, the European Council confirmed 
a compromise on adapting the EU funding instrument for 
peace and security so as to empower the EU to support mili-
tary actors in partner countries under the heading Capacity 
Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD). 
For the period 2018 to 2020, 100 million euros will be made 
available for this form of capacity-building, which must not 
include financing running military budgets, weapons, am-
munition or combat training. See European Parliament/ 
European Parliamentary Research Service, The EU’s New 
Approach to Funding Peace and Security, Briefing – EU Legislation 
in Progress, Fourth Edition (15 September 2017), 6. 
and Enhance Initiative”, which had a federal budget 
of 100 million euros in 2016 and a further 30 million 
euros in 2017. In 2016 projects in the focus countries 
“primarily, but not exclusively, concerned supporting 
Iraq in the fight against the terrorist militia IS; Tuni-
sia and Jordan in border security; Nigeria in fighting 
the terrorist militia Boko Haram; and Mali in building 
state structures to combat Islamist terrorists”.118 
These measures are not tied to military operations 
abroad. In part, they are meant to prevent the spread 
of instability in partner countries in the first place. 
However, the German government has informed the 
Bundestag that it regards the participation of Ger-
many in the UN and EU missions to Mali and in the 
anti-IS coalition in Iraq as a selection criterion for 
“Enable and Enhance” measures, which could be com-
plementary.119 The initiative essentially reflects a 
preference for more indirect intervention, rather than 
direct military involvement in crisis management. 
A similar logic drives the German and European 
support for the African Union in operationalising the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This 
potentially affects European operations abroad as 
actors from the regions concerned are meant to be 
active in crisis management and peacekeeping them-
selves, as has repeatedly been the case with AU mis-
sions, starting in Burundi from 2003 to 2004. How-
ever, with the exception of AMISOM, these African 
peace operations relatively quickly handed over 
responsibility to UN missions or were morphed into a 
hybrid AU/UN mission as in Darfur. Moreover, despite 
all the progress made in building APSA, the results 
have so far fallen below the expectations of African 
and external actors.120 
 
118 Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Ab-
geordneten Jan van Aken, Christine Buchholz, Annette Groth, weiterer 
Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke, Document 18/11358, Ger-
man Bundestag, Document 18/11889, 7 April 2017, 5, http:// 
dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/118/1811889.pdf (accessed 
23 March 2018). Since then, new individual projects have been 
added, e.g. in Lebanon, Niger and Chad. 
119 Ibid., 2. 
120 See Judith Vorrath, “Wo steht die Afrikanische Frie-
dens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur? Bilanz und Herausforde-
rungen”, Sicherheit + Frieden 31, no. 1 (2013): 23–28. 
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Missions providing security assistance 
to governments in conflict need to be 
closely monitored. 
Given the growing resistance to large-format opera-
tions abroad, military capacity-building of partners 
will continue to gain in importance in the coming 
years as an instrument of German and European 
security policy. Some examples demonstrate, how-
ever, that “enhancing and enabling” only works 
under very specific conditions, namely when such 
measures complement rather than replace already 
established stabilisation or peacekeeping operations. 
Above all, missions providing security assistance to 
governments in specific conflict configurations need 
to be closely monitored to ensure that they are not 
counterproductive by aggravating the conflict. This 
notion transcends the well-established criterion of 
partner countries having to respect human rights, 
because by choosing a partner to assist, Germany 
anticipates its own indirect participation in a conflict. 
When the German government decides to improve or 
expand the military capacities of another country’s 
government, it sides with it. This has political con-
sequences that need to be taken into account, includ-
ing when considering the relationship of operations 
abroad and “enhancing and enabling” in general.121 
Transnational Threats and 
Conflict Factors 
A fundamental challenge for all types of peace opera-
tions is that, unlike important conflict dynamics, they 
tend to be limited to one country of deployment. 
This aspect is not new in itself, but it has noticeably 
gained in importance through stronger regional and 
global intertwining. This concerns not merely “new 
threats”, such as transnational terrorism or organised 
crime, but the complex connection between these 
phenomena in conflict zones. Sources of income from 
war economies can prolong conflicts if they offer 
 
121 For critical appraisals of enable-and-enhance opera-
tions, see Stephen Biddle, Julia MacDonald and Ryan Baker, 
“Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness 
of Security Force Assistance”, Journal of Strategic Studies 41, 
no. 1–2 (2018): 89–142; Mara Karlin, “Why Military Assis-
tance Programs Disappoint. Minor Tools Can’t Solve Major 
Problems”, Foreign Affairs, (November/December 2017), https:// 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/why-military-
assistance-programs-disappoint (accessed 23 March 2018). 
relevant violent actors a lasting economic incentive or 
simply the means to continue the conflict. Moreover, 
state and non-state actors and their motives are in-
creasingly difficult to distinguish. Since groups with 
quite different interests converge – and are further-
more active across borders – such complex networks 
complicate concluding a sustainable peace agree-
ment, especially since they are potentially tools for 
other states to intervene in conflicts indirectly or 
profit from them. 
For missions in countries that are characterised by 
such cross-border threats, four key questions need 
convincing answers: 
1) how to guarantee the security of the personnel 
deployed in such an environment; 
2) how to ensure the implementation of the mandate; 
3) how to avoid playing into the hands of criminal or 
terrorist actors; 
4) and whether a mission should combat the actors or 
inhibit their activities. 
The relevant departments in international organi-
sations are already addressing the first issue intensively. 
Questions 2 and 3 have to be solved depending on the 
context, using the relevant analytical capacities with-
in the missions and at the headquarters of the deploy-
ing organisations. Nevertheless, there are overarching 
ideas and concepts on how to consolidate peace in 
such a context and avoid accidentally strengthening 
criminal actors122 – even though concrete mission 
instructions from multilateral organisations are still 
pending. 
The really controversial issue, however, is point 4: 
participating in the direct fight against transnational 
organised crime and terrorism. Many mandates for 
peace operations do refer in one way or another 
to these phenomena and the associated dangers.123 
These include missions to which Germany currently 
contributes substantially – such as MINUSMA, 
UNIFIL, EUTM Mali, EUNAVFOR Med-Operation 
Sophia, Resolute Support and Operation Sea Guar-
dian. However, references to these threats are not 
always accompanied by a mandate for actual tasks. 
 
122 See e.g. Louise Bosetti, James Cockayne and John de 
Boer, Crime-Proofing Conflict Prevention, Management, and Peace-
building: A Review of Emerging Good Practice, Occasional Paper 6 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 
August 2016). 
123 A list of references to organised crime in UN mandates 
can be found in Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw and Arthur 
Boutellis, The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations 
Deal with Organized Crime? (New York, 2013). 
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While EUNAVFOR Med shall directly engage in com-
bating the smuggling and trafficking of humans in 
the Mediterranean, the majority of mandates con-
cerns assisting governments and national security 
forces. MINUSMA, for instance, is meant to help the 
Malian government in tackling the arms trade, and 
MONUSCO is helping the Congolese government to 
prevent armed groups from profiting from the illegal 
trade in natural resources. 
In general, peace missions were and are associated 
with a large number of measures that can be con-
sidered direct or indirect contributions to fighting 
organised crime related to the trafficking in arms or 
drugs, the smuggling of diamonds and raw materials 
as well as of human beings, and piracy.124 The inter-
national engagement in Kosovo was far-reaching in 
this respect – particularly due to its executive man-
date. To this day EULEX Kosovo works intensely 
on organised crime. The measures employed by 
MINUSTAH – the recently replaced UN mission to 
Haiti – were similarly comprehensive, tackling drug 
trafficking and the violence of drug cartels, among 
other factors. 
The role of peace operations in combating terror-
ism is even more selective and controversial. Few 
multilateral missions have mandates authorising 
such interventions: one example is Operation Sea 
Guardian. Several other operations provide capacity-
building in counter-terrorism in the country of 
deployment. 
The UN last made clear statements on the role of 
peace operations in combating terrorism in the HIPPO 
reform report and the Secretary-General’s implemen-
tation report: “UN Peacekeeping operations […] are 
not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism 
operations”.125 A large number of observers in re-
search and political consultancy agree – not only 
because UN operations lack the necessary equipment, 
training, logistics and intelligence, but also because 
the engagement in combating terrorism is hard to 
reconcile with the basic principles of peace opera-
tions. Expectations are that this debate will gain in 
momentum and that the role of peace operations will 
 
124 For an overview of concrete examples, see Wibke 
Hansen, Mehr Interaktion als geplant. Friedenseinsätze und Orga-
nisierte Kriminalität in fragilen Staaten, Wissenschaftliche 
Schriften der WWU Münster, Reihe VII, vol. 12 (Münster, 
2013), 22f. 
125 See also United Nations, United Nations, Uniting Our 
Strengths for Peace (see note 64), 45. 
be interpreted in a more nuanced way in this area, 
given the increased weighting of anti-terrorism policy 
within the UN, especially through the creation of 
the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, and efforts to im-
prove internal coordination of such work.126 
One fundamental problem remains, however. The 
described threats mostly fall under the responsibility 
of domestic law-enforcement authorities; predomi-
nantly military approaches are therefore contested. 
Military interventions are particularly problematic 
when – like EUFOR Althea in Bosnia – they apply 
a different approach in pursuing criminals than a 
parallel EU policing mission.127 At the same time, the 
states concerned are, for various reasons, often not in 
a position to proceed with effective law-enforcement. 
Exchanging information and cross-border cooperation 
are also difficult. In Mali, the civilian mission EUCAP 
Sahel Mali therefore assists in the fight against trans-
national crime. However, since its scope for action is 
limited by the volatile security situation, here too 
there are unanswered questions over the relationship 
between military and police/civilian means.128 
While criminal and terrorist groups easily move 
across state borders within their region, international 
contingents are limited to operations in the country 
of deployment. The UN’s efforts to increase coopera-
tion between “neighbouring” peace operations – 
initially proposed mainly with a view to West Africa 
– should also be seen in this context.129 The direct 
 
126 See Hartmut Behr, “Die Antiterrorismuspolitik der 
UN seit dem Jahr 2001”, Vereinte Nationen 65, no. 4 (2017): 
147–51; Timo Smit, Multilateral Peace Operations and the Chal-
lenges of Terrorism and Violent Extremism, SIPRI Background 
Paper (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute [SIPRI], 2017). 
127 Sasha Jesperson, “Assessing Militarised Responses 
to Transnational Organised Crime”, in Militarised Responses to 
Transnational Organised Crime, ed. Tuesday Reitano, Lucia Bird 
Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo and Sasha Jesperson (Cham, 2018), 1–9 
(4). 
128 The European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR) can 
be deployed at this interface as part of UN, EU or NATO in-
ternational crisis management. Most recently, this occurred 
in Mali, the Central African Republic and Afghanistan. The 
EU is also working to improve the exchange of data between 
police, intelligence services and the military during opera-
tions such as EUNAVFOR Med. 
129 See also the remarks and recommendations of the SG 
Reports on Intermission Cooperation, S/2005/135, Report of 
the Secretary-General on Inter-mission Cooperation and Possible Cross-
border Operations between the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations 
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cooperation between peace operations, however, has 
primarily concentrated on sharing resources, espe-
cially by assisting new missions: for instance, the 
recently closed-down UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire 
(ONUCI) helped set up MINUSMA in Mali. Joint mili-
tary and police activities, as practiced by the UN 
missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, 
have so far remained the exception. 
Therefore, troops from neighbouring and directly 
affected states are frequently deployed in cases of 
sustained terrorist threats. Examples are the G5 Sahel 
Joint Force, the Regional Cooperation Initiative 
against the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, South 
Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, and the Multi-National Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad region focusing 
mainly on combating Boko Haram. Such coalitions 
can act across borders, especially in cases of hot pur-
suit. However, they are mainly based on bilateral 
agreements between participating states and, as such, 
are not a formal part of the African Peace and Secu-
rity Architecture.130 The EU and some of its members 
mainly appear as financial sponsors for operational-
ising such Joint Forces, which are thus ultimately a 
variant of building partner capacities.131 
When and How to Exit 
For years, the political debate in Germany and else-
where revolved around criteria for participating in 
operations abroad rather than issues of effectiveness, 
success (or rather achievement of objectives), and 
exiting. If reflections on exit management occurred, 
they were suspected of being synonymous with short-
term and half-hearted commitment. Political deci-
sion-makers also feared sending negative or counter-
productive signals to the country of deployment 
 
Operation in Cote d’Ivoire, http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/ 
11176/20190/S_2005_135-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y 
(accessed 23 March 2018). 
130 All three, however, were authorised by the AU Peace 
and Security Council. Moreover, for the MNJTF, a Strategic 
Support Unit within the AU is responsible inter alia for 
coordinating the contributions of international donors. 
131 See Denis M. Tull, Mali, the G5 and Security Sector Assis-
tance. Political Obstacles to Effective Cooperation, SWP Comment 
52/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 
2017); Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, 
Africa Report no. 258 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
12 December 2017). 
through the open discussion of exit strategies and 
timing, and thus encouraging potential “spoilers of 
peace” while discouraging constructive actors. Finally, 
the issue of withdrawal is associated with a dilemma. 
No troop-contributing state wants to commit its con-
tribution indeterminately; yet it is generally almost 
impossible to schedule an end date right at the start 
of an operation. 
Exit management always becomes a prominent 
part of the debate when political pressure grows – 
whether in the country of deployment or among the 
providers of troops – to withdraw (from) a specific 
operation. It is this political pressure that shapes the 
ensuing discussion, and ultimately also exit manage-
ment, as the example of Afghanistan shows. In Ger-
many and elsewhere, a debate about exit criteria and 
options is just as crucial as one about entry or partici-
pation in a mission. 
The question of exit needs answering on two levels: 
the level of the executing international or regional or-
ganisation (how long will the operation last?) and the level 
of individual states contributing troops (how long will 
their national contribution have to be?). Two fundamental 
approaches can be distinguished in exit management. 
The end of an operation can be scheduled or tied to 
achieving specific objectives. Each approach comes 
with its own challenges. 
Scheduled Exits 
Even though mandates for peace and crisis manage-
ment operations are initially only drawn up for a 
manageable period of six or twelve months, they are 
often repeatedly renewed. End of mandate and exit 
should therefore be viewed as distinct. 
A scheduled exit is only really an option for the 
international or regional organisations carrying out 
the operation if a follow-up mission is planned at a 
certain date or if the deployment is a bridging opera-
tion or short-term reinforcement. In both cases, a 
follow-up arrangement makes it possible to schedule 
the withdrawal from the start. In the past, the exit 
option for EU missions was often to have the UN take 
over – or rather EU operations provided short-term 
assistance to UN missions, as with Operation Artemis 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The situation is similar for national contributions, 
mainly for political reasons. Withdrawing a national 
contribution from an ongoing mission is of course a 
sovereign national decision. Purely from a planning 
perspective, the maximum length of a country’s par-
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ticipation could therefore be fixed early on. However, 
such a decision has a series of political and practical 
consequences due to the multilateral framework. 
Clear timelines can serve transparency and predict-
ability, but might also raise questions with partners 
over reliability and solidarity. Such timelines require 
multinational coordination and subsequent handling 
of very concrete operational consequences. Setting 
an end date for a national contribution to a multi-
national mission is primarily an option when a fol-
low-up has already been arranged, usually another 
member state stepping in. Germany has taken over 
some of the tasks of the Dutch contingent within 
MINUSMA, thus relieving it. Another example is the 
withdrawal of German helicopters from MINUSMA in 
June 2018, which had to be coordinated with Canada 
and El Salvador since the UN wanted to continue its 
operation uninterrupted. This means that the time 
required for military measures to repatriate the re-
spective capabilities has to be calculated; agreements 
have to be reached with the UN’s department for 
peacekeeping operations, the “relieving nation”, and 
the mission’s leadership in situ; and the modalities 
and timing of the transfer have to be settled at the 
national political and military levels. Unilaterally 
withdrawing its national contribution would be un-
thinkable for Germany, if only because of the asso-
ciated threat to the mission’s success and the political 
costs to its relationship with important partners. 
Exit Based on Benchmarks 
However, an exit can also be based on criteria or 
benchmarks. When multidimensional missions began 
in the late 1980s, it soon became clear that the crea-
tion of a functioning police and justice sector and an 
army fit for duty, as well as a viable reform of the 
security sector, needed to be seen as fundamental 
conditions for ending an operation. In other words: 
successful peace-building was soon considered the 
only responsible exit strategy. 
Relapse into conflict, such as initially in East Timor 
(2005) or the rapid succession of more than ten inter-
national missions to Haiti within a decade (1994–
2004) have shown the consequences of withdrawing 
before lasting stability has been attained: further 
operations are programmed. It is now well-known 
that any exit strategy needs to be based on stability 
criteria. However, what does this mean for its imple-
mentation? 
Exit benchmarks should be laid down for each 
operation abroad according to either quantitative or 
qualitative considerations, and be adapted over time 
if necessary. This requires reaching consensus via a 
multilateral consultation process while taking into 
account that at least some of the objectives can pre-
sumably not be achieved within a straightforward 
time frame. Once political pressure to withdraw 
grows, these goals will often no longer be the basis for 
decision-making. Nevertheless, an attempt should be 
made after a detailed analysis of each conflict context 
to define objectives and also interim objectives for 
each operation that are not overly ambitious, yet suf-
ficiently far-reaching to promote peace. This is what 
an analysis of effectiveness, decisions (for example 
about the use of funds), and the military planning 
and implementation of an ordered withdrawal need 
to be measured against. 
At the heart of the debate should 
be the strategy, benchmarks, and 
criteria for the successful conclusion 
of a mission. 
The overarching debate on the way in which 
missions or national contributions are ended is 
closely linked to the normative anchors for peace 
operations mentioned above, as well as the inter-
national consensus on which end state to strive for 
politically, i.e. how to define success. 
It is crucial that the domestic political debate 
reveals the dilemmas associated with exit strategies as 
much as distinct ideas about the forms and prerequi-
sites of a responsible exit – if only so that the con-
clusion of Bundeswehr operations is not regarded as 
“regularly unpredictable”.132 This also means facing a 
simple fact: security, stability and functioning institu-
tions cannot be created in six months, and not even 
in six years. Ultimately, the debate needs to focus less 
on timeframes and more on strategy, benchmarks, 
and criteria for the successful conclusion of a mission. 
 
 
132 Thomas Wiegold, “Klare Exit-Strategie bereits bei 
Beginn einer Mission”, Deutscher Bundeswehrverband, 
9 February 2017, https://www.dbwv.de/aktuelle-themen/ 
einsatz-aktuell/beitrag/news/klare-exit-strategie-bereits-bei-
beginn-einer-mission (accessed 23 March 2018). 
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The challenges discussed in this study highlight 
contradictions that can only partially be resolved. 
Every decision by the Bundestag and federal govern-
ment is ultimately a balancing act: an increasingly 
complex crisis landscape, a difficult global political 
situation, and the prevalent political mood in Ger-
many – whose voters are reticent about it assuming 
a greater role in international crises – are all deci-
sive.133 It is almost impossible to make reliable state-
ments about what the Bundeswehr’s operations 
abroad might look in 10 or 15 years’ time. This would 
depend on numerous variables that German policy 
largely cannot influence and which are highly vola-
tile as well. Even more uncertain is the room to 
manoeuvre for security policy actors should violent 
conflicts on Europe’s periphery further escalate. 
The worst solution would be for Ger-
many to take a stance primarily on a 
case-by-case basis and at short notice. 
At the same, expectations of German foreign and 
security policy have almost continuously been rising 
since the 1990s – whether at the European level or 
beyond. The German non-permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council 2019/20 is a vehicle as much as an 
obligation in this regard. Given its membership in the 
only body that can make binding decisions for all UN 
members, the worst of all possible solutions would be 
for Germany to take a stance primarily on a case-by-
case basis and at short notice. Crisis-driven decisions 
contradict the primacy of prevention and even as a 
mainly reactive approach do not go far enough. More-
 
133 However, in the latest Körber-Foundation survey, the 
percentage of those in favour of Germany committing itself 
more strongly rose slightly, to 43 percent (see Körber Foun-
dation, Einmischen oder zurückhalten? Aktualisierung 2017. Eine 
repräsentative Umfrage im Auftrag der Körber-Stiftung zur Sicht der 
Deutschen auf die Außenpolitik [Berlin, 2017]). 
over, the debate on Germany’s leadership respon-
sibility, which has been ongoing since 2014, now 
has an additional European dimension. Therefore, 
the following five points should be considered with 
regard to the future of military operations abroad. 
Defining Political Cornerstones 
Creating a sustainable consensus on the political 
objectives to be pursued or the “politically desired 
end state” of a mission is a top priority. Only then 
can the UN Security Council and influential member 
states set in motion, accompany and support a com-
prehensive political process in which missions are 
embedded. These processes require greater effort and 
attention than they have been granted so far. The 
political weight of regional organisations and indi-
vidual UN member states must be used in a more 
targeted manner. With Germany’s tenure as non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council it will 
be able to exert more direct influence than before. On 
the one hand, the focus should be on supporting the 
Secretary-General’s agenda to improve prevention 
and respective reform processes in the organisation 
with a view to reducing the need for future interven-
tions. On the other hand, given the many deadlocked 
conflicts and ongoing missions, political support for 
effective crisis management and peace-building must 
also be strengthened. Supporting the establishment 
of so called “groups of friends” for specific missions 
could furthermore help to secure political support for 
the full length of their deployment. As UN Secretary-
General Guterres stressed in September 2017 in his 
presentation on the reform of UN peace operations, 
“United Nations peace operations must be deployed 
in support of – not in place of – active diplomatic 
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efforts.”134 Ongoing efforts to reform the UN peace 
and security architecture are critical but can only be 
a first step in this direction. 
While normative benchmarks in peace-building 
and state-building have been disputed before and 
have to be renegotiated time and time again there are 
now more fundamental rifts particularly as political 
weights and dependencies have shifted with a new, 
emerging set of relevant state actors. Moreover, 
democracy and the rule of law are coming under 
pressure in Western societies as well. It is therefore 
all the more important that the normative core of any 
German commitment is clearly identified and com-
municated early on in international fora: what does 
Germany hope to achieve politically with its opera-
tions abroad? At the international level, the corner-
stones of multilateral engagement are defined before 
actual decisions on deployments are taken in Ger-
many. Solidarity towards allies remains a yardstick in 
German security policy, but on its own it offers little 
orientation for decision making. In future, German 
policy will itself have to set out political cornerstones 
for a commitment – be it military or civilian – in a 
timely and proactive manner. For a parliamentary 
army such as the Bundeswehr, it is also crucial that the 
Bundestag engages in ongoing debates about opera-
tions and accompanies them. The German parliament 
should therefore consider establishing a missions com-
mittee reflecting the comprehensive approach in its 
composition. 
Focus on Responsible Exit 
Setting clear and realistic goals is consistently cited 
as a key factor for successful operations. A review of 
ongoing UN missions to determine whether their 
mandates are even realisable should contribute to 
better defining tasks and objectives. Yet, Germany 
should work to ensure that other actors do not use 
this process to abandon the multidimensional ap-
proach and politically controversial goals prematurely. 
Rather, it is important to describe the desired end 
state of an operation more clearly in general, not just 
within the UN framework. 
 
134 “Peace Operations ‘Not a Substitute’ for Diplomatic 
Efforts, Security Council Told”, UN News, 20 September 2017, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/565672-peace-operations-
not-substitute-diplomatic-efforts-security-council-told 
(accessed 23 March 2018). 
This concerns both the previously mentioned 
debate of exit options and the control mechanisms 
that are geared towards an end state. While it will 
always be necessary to adapt mandates and equip-
ment, adjustments should be based on consistent 
monitoring of the situation and coordination with 
other instruments. This also means more effective 
networking on the German side, without blurring the 
responsibilities of different actors. 
For operations where there is no “peace to keep”, 
the primary issue is how to contain violence against 
the civilian population without complicating the 
search for a lasting solution to the conflict. In addi-
tion to protecting civilians through UN peace opera-
tions, this could also entail short-term support mis-
sions. For these, the goal is clearly defined, but at 
the same time the (political) scope is limited. 
Avoiding Fragmentation 
From the German perspective, a UN mandate should 
continue to be a prerequisite for every operation 
abroad. However, even where a consensus exists in 
the UN Security Council, the formats for today’s 
operations are extremely varied. The spectrum ranges 
from operations carried out by individual states at the 
request of the government of the country of deploy-
ment via ad-hoc coalitions outside of existing struc-
tures to missions that are fully integrated institution-
ally – at times all in the same conflict context. 
A large number of non-military missions and 
actors are usually active in the same place – often 
with German support, including personnel. This 
increases the need for information and coordination 
for national ministries and for various international 
actors. However, there is still considerable discrepancy 
between the rhetoric of the comprehensive approach 
and operational reality. With its focus on stabilisa-
tion, Germany increasingly supports projects along-
side operations abroad. In addition to the coordina-
tion of military and civilian actors on the ground, 
the use of instruments such as mediation and peace-
building is also required. 
Expanding Conflict Analysis 
The provision of resources for missions is only one 
side of the coin. Comprehensive analyses in advance 
and ongoing assessments of the impact of individual 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
SWP Berlin 
Missions in a Changing World: 
The Bundeswehr and Its Operations Abroad 
September 2018 
42 
missions that extend beyond a description of the 
situation are the other side. This requires realism: 
detailed evaluations have been demanded time and 
again, but they are almost impossible to deliver 
during an ongoing deployment and as a means of 
monitoring progress. By using progress reports or 
similar instruments effective ways have to be found 
to follow and assess the political dynamics in the 
country of deployment and draw conclusions for the 
further progress of the mission, its strategy and im-
plementation. With current changes in conflict pat-
terns, it is particularly vital to reflect on how leaders 
and the deployed forces can deal with cross-border 
challenges and the non-formalised orders that exist 
in fragile states. Constructs of “governance without 
government”135 may be a normative deviation from 
the Western model of the modern state, but often 
enough they are also expressions of society’s ability 
to adapt and survive.136 A differentiated assessment 
of dynamics, actors and potential partners on the 
ground is therefore essential. Whilst operations ab-
road cannot ignore the threats by terrorism or orga-
nised crime, they should not be used to fight these 
without prior reflection. Criminal or terrorist labels 
should not be rashly assigned to non-state armed 
actors and a principal convergence of criminal net-
works and violent actors should not simply be as-
sumed. It is essential to take a close look and invest 
in an accompanying analysis to avoid negative side-
effects of outside actions. International policing 
expertise – whether it is integrated, as in UN mis-
sions, or in separate civilian missions – must be 
incorporated where primarily military coalitions act 
against transnational threats. This is just as relevant 
for the political strategy guiding the action as for 
specific capacity-building projects. 
Think beyond “Enable & Enhance” 
Capacity-building in partner countries will grow in 
importance. Along with countless bilateral initiatives, 
Europe will in the future provide advice, training 
and equipment for security forces e.g. via Capacity-
 
135 See Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Governance 
without a State: Can It Work?”, Regulation and Governance 4, 
no. 2 (2010): 113–34. 
136 Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach, “State Fragility as 
a Development Policy Challenge”, Rural 21 46, no. 1 (2012): 
6–9 (9). 
Building in support of Security and Development 
(CBSD) and, as hitherto, via CSDP missions. But how 
should the German bilateral “Enable & Enhance 
Initiative” be linked to operations abroad, currently 
especially in the priority countries of Mali and Iraq? 
Political decision-makers in Germany often still 
view Enable & Enhance as an alternative to a more 
far-reaching direct intervention. In fact, military 
capacity-building measures in some cases aim to 
prevent widespread destabilisation in the first place. 
At the same time, a presence on the ground is vital 
for implementing projects and particularly in the 
context of conflict, this will usually mean participat-
ing in larger and more comprehensive missions. 
Enable & Enhance is thus not a substitute for direct 
military intervention, but rather complements it. 
In this parliamentary term, it will be important 
to evaluate the previous German and multilateral ex-
periences with capacity-building in partner countries 
and to make them available for further development 
of the concept. The experiences with Enable & En-
hance in the context of persistent conflicts will be 
especially valuable here: with regard to the risk of 
being seen as a conflict party, the challenges posed 
by armed non-state actors, and the “fog” of intrastate 
conflicts. German and European support for the 
transnational operation of security forces within the 
G5 Sahel Joint Force may be an understandable step 
in the current situation. Yet, this cooperation be-
tween five states must be integrated into the regional 
context. As it stands, the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) regards the G5 as a 
competitor since it operates outside of the structures 
of the African peace and security architecture, of 
which ECOWAS is one regional pillar. It is therefore 
urgent and imperative to include ECOWAS. 
Outlook: 
Responsibility, Reliability, Resources 
Beyond the concrete recommendations related to 
the five aspects outlined above, any discussion of mis-
sions abroad by the German Armed Forces must be 
placed into context. After more than 20 years, opera-
tions abroad have become an established part of Ger-
man security policy. The 1994 ruling of the Constitu-
tional Court and the 2005 Parliamentary Participation 
Act have given them a solid legal framework. The 
operations themselves contributed to a “normalisa-
tion” of Germany’s foreign and security policy that 
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has been partly called for and partly feared. Their 
multilateral embedding and their legal foundation 
in UN Security Council mandates have – despite all 
justified criticism and associated controversies – 
also been proof of Germany’s commitment to a rules-
based world order. This needs to be kept in mind, 
especially during times when that order is being 
challenged or undermined. 
Germany’s policy within the European Union over 
the next few years will be significantly determined by 
one assumption: in a changed security environment, 
the EU must be able to act with greater autonomy – 
i.e. more independently from the US – and also show 
greater international commitment than it has to 
date.137 This does not necessarily mean more EU 
peace operations, but concerns all foreign and secu-
rity policy instruments. Looking at Germany’s role in 
Europe, it will be virtually impossible to stand on the 
sidelines, not least as security and defence policy has 
been defined as one of the key areas to drive integra-
tion processes. Numerous European politicians see a 
militarily capable EU as an added value not just in 
security policy, but also in integration policy.138 
Due to the obvious financial and military limita-
tions of individual states, multilateral action in 
security and defence policy increasingly means action 
that is militarily integrated. This has political con-
sequences. In the 1950s, surrendering sovereignty 
over foreign policy within the European community 
was a prerequisite for Germany regaining its sover-
eignty; today deepened cooperation (if not integration) 
in security policy is the precondition for preserving a 
country’s ability to act. Even though Germany’s lead-
ing role within the EU is being called into question 
and is only just beginning to take shape in NATO 
while the “intervention scepticism” of the German 
public seems to persist, any claim to shape the politi-
cal order must be put into concrete political and mil-
itary terms in the coming years. This does not only 
concern EU and NATO, but also UN engagement. 
Traditionally, Germany has been very reticent about 
 
137 See the speech by Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, 
“Europa in einer unbequemeren Welt. Warum Europa 
eine neue Außenpolitik braucht”, 5 December 2017, https:// 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/berliner-forum-
aussenpolitik/746464 (accessed 23 March 2018). 
138 On the most recent developments in this policy area, 
see Rosa Beckmann and Ronja Kempin, EU Defence Policy Needs 
Strategy. Time for Political Examination of the CSDP’s Reform Objec-
tives, SWP Comment 34/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, September 2017). 
meeting its obligations to the UN and especially to the 
latter’s peacekeeping missions, aside from making 
financial contributions. In the 2016 White Paper, the 
UN is top of the list as an international arena, ahead 
of NATO and the EU. But until operation MINUSMA 
in Mali, Berlin has, in the last decade, only contributed 
to UN peace operations to a limited extent. 
Ad-hoc coalitions should remain the exception for 
Bundeswehr operations abroad. The federal govern-
ment would be well-advised to make this very clear to 
its partners in NATO and the EU. The Bundestag will 
have to examine more closely to what extent it can 
(still) fulfil its political oversight on such operations 
in conjunction with other national parliaments. 
Operations abroad (especially as part of EU missions) 
aiming to train partners in the EU’s neighbourhood 
will be more frequent. This largely means continuing 
current capacity-building efforts, including as part of 
CSDP training missions led by staff from the recently 
established Military Planning and Conduct Capability. 
In the event of renewed outbreaks of massive vio-
lence in Europe’s neighbourhood, Germany could still 
envisage UN-mandated operations similar in scope 
and/or objectives to those in Bosnia, Kosovo or Mali. 
Traditional peacekeeping operations also seem feasible 
again, as the debate over a potential UN peacekeeping 
operation in eastern Ukraine made clear.139 
With its exposed position in international politics 
and its economic strength, Germany can deliver more 
than others, but this “more” has to go beyond increased 
military capabilities or the well-known chequebook 
diplomacy. As a guiding principle for Germany’s par-
ticipation in peace and crisis management operations, 
“quality before quantity” is also of limited use. First and 
foremost, Germany’s commitment must have a coor-
dinated political direction. The (further) development 
of its own instruments and capacities – including 
for Bundeswehr operations abroad – must be geared 
towards that. With its Guidelines on crisis prevention 
and conflict resolution and White Paper, the federal 
government established a framework during the last 
legislative period that now needs to be elaborated. 
 
139 See Can Peacekeepers Break the Deadlock in Ukraine?, 
Europe Report no. 246 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
15 December 2017); Alexei Arbatov, “A U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operation Is the Only Way Forward in Ukraine”, War on the 
Rocks, 28 September 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/ 
09/a-u-n-peacekeeping-operation-is-the-only-way-forward-in-
ukraine (accessed 23 March 2018). 
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Abbreviations 
AFISMA African-Led International Support  
Mission to Mali 
AKUF Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Kriegsursachenforschung (Working Group 
Research on the Origins of War) 
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia 
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture 
AU African Union 
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 
CBSD Capacity Building in Support of Security  
and Development 
CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Union of 
Germany/Christian Social Union 
CJTF-OIR Combined Joint Task Force – Operation 
Inherent Resolve 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African 
States 
EEAS European External Action Service 
eFP enhanced Forward Presence 
EU European Union 
EUCAP European Union Capacity Building Mission 
EUFOR European Union Force 
EULEX European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force 
EUROGENDFOR European Gendarmerie Force 
EUSTAMS European Union Stabilisation Action in 
Mopti and Segou 
EUTM European Union Training Mission 
FDP Free Democratic Party 
GG Grundgesetz (Basic Law) 
HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations 
IS “Islamic State” 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
KFOR Kosovo Force 
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in the Central African 
Republic 
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum 
in Western Sahara 
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali 
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
MNJTF Multi-National Joint Task Force 
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the DR Congo 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
ONUCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe 
P5 Permanent Five 
PRISM Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, 
Integrated approach, Stabilisation and 
Mediation 
R2P Responsibility to protect 
RSM Resolute Support Mission 
SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany 
STRATAIR 
MEDEVAC 
Strategic Air Medical Evacuation 
TEU Treaty on the European Union 
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
UN United Nations 
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of 
South Sudan 
UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II 
UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya 
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia 
VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 
VPR Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 
(Defence-Policy Guidelines) 
WEU Western European Union 
ZIF Centre for International Peace Operations 
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Overview:  
Military operations abroad by the Bundeswehr – German and international troop contingents 
Mission German soldiers 
(maximum) 
Total soldiers  
(maximum) 
Sources 
Artemis 350 (2003) ca. 2,000  
(2003, stationed)  
Document 15/1168 (13 June 2003);  
Damien Helly, “Operation ARTEMIS 
(RD Congo)”, in European Security and 
Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999–
2009), ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien 
Helly and Daniel Keohane (Paris: EU 
Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 
181–85 
EUFOR RD Congo 780 (2006) 2,466  
(2006, stationed) 
Document 16/1507 (17 May 2006); 
Annemarie Peen Rodt, “The EU: 
A Successful Military Conflict 
Manager?”, Democracy and Security 7, 
no. 2 (June 2011) 
EUTM Mali 350 (2015) 584  
(2015, stationed) 
Document 18/3836 (28 January 
2015);  
Thierry Tardy, CSDP in Action. What 
Contribution to International Security?, 
Chaillot Paper 134 (Paris, 2015) 
International Security 
Assistance Force 
5,350 (2010/11) ca. 130,000  
(2011, stationed) 
Document 17/654 (9 February 2010)/ 
Document 17/4402 (13 January 
2011); UN Security Council, Letter 
Dated 28 November 2014 from the Secre-
tary-General Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, S/2014/856 
Kosovo Force 8,500 (1999–
2008) 
ca. 50,000  
(1999, stationed) 
Document 14/1133 (11 June 1999); 
NATO, Kosovo Force (KFOR) – How Did It 
Evolve?, updated 20 February 2008 
MINUSMA 1,000 (2017) 13,289  
(2016/17, mandated) 
Document 18/10819  
(11 January 2017)  
Operation Inherent 
Resolve 
150 (2016/17) no details available Document 18/7207 (6 January 2016)/ 
Document 18/10820 (11 January 
2017) 
Resolute Support 
Mission 
980 (2016/17) 16,000  
(as of 2018, stationed) 
2017: 13 576 
Document 18/6743 (18 November 
2015)/ Document 18/10347 
(16 November 2016) und Document 
19/21 (25 October 2017); NATO, 
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, 
November 2017; NATO, Resolute 
Support Mission (RSM) – Key Facts and 
Figures, May 2017 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
